



“Mega-Sports Events, Gentrification and Social Mobilization in Rio de Janeiro”

- Experiences from Metrô Mangueira

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Abstract

In order to promote gentrification of the city of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian government and the municipality of Rio de Janeiro have actively used Mega-Sports Events (MSE) in urban planning. Examples are tax cuts and the legalization of various measures for large-scale urban programs, to prepare the city for hosting these prestigious events. Whilst trying to fulfil the obligations from MSEs, the host city denies its citizens access to democratic participation and thereby their right to the city. The promises made to the international sportive federations regarding upgraded infrastructure, sportive arenas, media coverage and security have created enormous pressure on the city's politicians. Thousands of families have been evicted from their homes to create space for urban projects. Many of these have been offered housing by 'Minha Casa Minha Vida' on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, far away from work and education opportunities. In response to the forced evictions, the urban poor have resisted and several mobilizations and protests have occurred in Rio de Janeiro since 2009.

Favela dwellers from Metrô Mangueira were first threatened by forced evictions in 2010 due to the upgrading of *Maracanã and around* for the World Cup in 2014. The authorities offered the residents housing through 'Minha Casa Minha Vida' in Cosmos, approximately 70 km away. The residents refused and created a community committee to lead the mobilization. The Committee of Metrô Mangueira created vertical and horizontal linkages with public defenders, the State University of Rio de Janeiro, international media and other favelas in similar situations. Several times during the resistance activities at Metrô Mangueira, there were brutal encounters between the residents and the military police, and the international media focused attention on the unfair treatment the residents of Metrô Mangueira had to suffer as a result of the World Cup preparations.

Despite being denied participation in the planning process by means of active citizenship and the use of invented spaces for participation, the residents of Metro Mangueira succeeded in attracting the authorities' attention towards their claims. After two years of struggles, the residents of Metrô Mangueira got housing in Mangueira. The social mobilization at Metrô Mangueira created an insurgent citizenship that fight for a right to the city. The success of this social mobilization has been of great importance even after the fading of the mobilization itself, with other collective actions building on this and other similar precedents.

Key words: *Mega-sports events. World Cup. Olympics. Urban Planning. Gentrification. Social Mobilization. Citizenship. Insurgent citizenship. Invented Spaces. The right to the city. Minha Casa Minha Vida. Favela.*

Resumo em Portuguese

O governo brasileiro e o município do Rio de Janeiro tem usado ativamente a Mega-eventos esportivos (MSE) em seu planejamento urbano na tentativa de renovar a cidade. Reduções fiscais e legalização de várias medidas para programas urbanos de larga escala foram sancionadas, preparando a cidade para receber estes prestigiados eventos. Ao mesmo tempo que tentando cumprir o obrigações das MSEs, a cidade anfitriã nega os cidadãos a sua ação e, portanto, o seus direitos à cidade. As promessas de melhorias infraestruturais, arenas esportivas, cobertura de imprensa e segurança feitas para as federações esportivas internacionais criaram uma enorme pressão nos políticos. Despejos forçados foram usados para remover milhares de famílias de suas residências para dar espaço para os projetos urbanísticos. A muitos dos desfavorecidos atingidos pelas remoções foram oferecidas novas residências através do programa ‘Minha Casa, Minha Vida’ em áreas periféricas do Rio de Janeiro, área carente de oportunidades de emprego, estudo e saúde. Em relação às remoções, muitos dos desfavorecidos resistiram e diversos protestos ocorreram no Rio de Janeiro desde 2009.

Moradores da favela Metrô Mangueira foram removidos inicialmente em 2010 devido as preparações do Maracanã e adjacencias, para a Copa do Mundo de 2014. As autoridades ofereceram aos moradores residências do ‘Minha Casa Minha Vida’ em Cosmos, periferia do Rio de Janeiro, aproximadamente a 70 quilômetros da Mangueira. Muitos dos residentes de Metrô Mangueira se recusaram a mudar para longe de suas residências originais, e criaram um comitê para se mobilizarem. O comitê de Metrô Mangueira criou ligações com defensores publicos, a Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, mídias internacionais e com outras favelas em condições similares. Diversas vezes durante as resistências em Metrô Mangueira, houveram encontros brutais entre moradores e a polícia militar, e a mídia internacional divulgou o tratamento injusto que Metrô Mangueira teve de sofrer devido as preparações para a Copa do Mundo.

Pela falta de possibilidades em participar no processo de planejamento, os cidadãos de Metro Mangueira atraves de uma *cidadania activa* mudaram sua condicao atual para uma *insurgente cidadania*, onde uso *espaços inventados* para argumentar e ter a atencao das autoridades em relacao as suas demandas. Depois de dois anos de dificuldades, os residentes de Metrô Mangueira conseguiram casas em Mangueira. O sucesso desta mobilização social tem sido de extrema importancia mesmo depois do desaparecimento desta mobilização, à medida em que outras ações coletivas baseiam-se nesta e em similares mobilizações precedentes¹.

¹ Translated by Juliana Santos Rangel dos Passos

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List of Acronyms

AMM - Associação dos Moradores da Mangueira

FIFA – Federation Internationale de Football Association

GC – Gated Community

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IOC – International Olympic Committee

MCMV – Minha Casa Minha Vida

MSE – Mega-Sports Event

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

PAC – Federal Growth Acceleration Programme

PPP – Public-Private Partnership

SAP – Structural Adjustment Program

UERJ – State University of Rio de Janeiro

UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora

1. Introduction

Mega-Sports Events (MSEs) are used as strategies for urban space discipline and capital accumulation. The countries chosen for the latest MSEs, such as the Commonwealth games, Pan America, Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup and Summer Olympics, are all fast-growing economies, however they also struggle with high internal economic- and social inequalities (Steinbrink, 2013, pp. 129-130). *“There is a hope that successfully staging a mega-event will help to shake off the stigma of ‘underdevelopment’ and will thus enable the country to cross the ‘threshold’ to the circle of leading industrial nations”* (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 131).

The Olympics have a dark history of evictions of poor people in hosting cities, dating back to 1936 where the Nazis evicted urban poor in Berlin to hide poverty from the international visitors (Davis, 2007, p. 106). Host cities use the Olympics to justify the evictions, as slums are seen as security problems (Davis, 2007, p. 111). Hosting MSEs makes governments ‘clean out’ the city of slums and its dwellers, to improve the visual image of the city (Davis, 2007, p. 104). The countries bidding for MSEs aim at gaining economic growth by attracting foreign direct investments and increase tourism. Nonetheless, the question remains: Do the investments made for hosting MSEs produce long or short-term effects, and does it benefits all the city’s residents?

In 2009 the Brazilian government published a document stating that 119 favelas in Rio de Janeiro were to be removed before the year 2016 (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 134). 67,000 people were evicted from their homes between 2009 and 2013 (Braathen & Sørbye, 2015), and 170,000 families have had their housing rights violated between 2007 and 2013 (Saborio, 2013, p. 137), 65,000 of these directly linked to projects implemented for the realization of MSEs (Oliveira, Vainer, Mascarenhas, Meinenstein, & Braathen, 2017, p. 8). According to Saborio (2013, p. 137) MSEs legalize forced evictions of poor communities, and the authorities used this legalization to start the evictions before the MSEs started and will continue after the games has ended (Saborio, 2013, p. 138). In 2013, forty thousand people were still threatened by evictions in Rio de Janeiro due to the MSEs (C. M. Sørbye, 2013).

The most common excuse used to argue for forced evictions of informal settlements is that the favela is threatened by environmental risk or vis-à-vis, when the truth is that the favela is in the way of making a global image when hosting the MSEs (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 134). Both physical

violence and mental abuse is associated with the evictions and a report from Amnesty International reveals that the problem of police related violence in Rio de Janeiro is increasing (Braathen & Sørbye, 2015). The capitalist agenda of the government and unnecessary police violence against urban poor, has contributed to the loss of the meaning of governance and people are demanding democracy with working mechanisms for participation, more transparency (Campos & Resende, 2014, p. 5) and the right to the city.

Public spaces, health institutions, cultural- and sportive projects were forced to close due to the lack of funds to keep them going, which had major impact on the society's most vulnerable people (Junior et al., 2015, p. 234). When the Olympic Games actually played out in 2016, the political and economic context of Brazil had changed dramatically. Speculative capital in Brazil, together with high income-disparity, non-democratic institutions and limited rights of participation and citizenship destroyed livelihoods of many people, especially the last decade, due to MSEs (Gaffney, 2013, p. 13). In this thesis, I explore how hosting MSEs in Rio de Janeiro has influenced the gentrification processes and social mobilizations in the city, using Metrô Mangueira as my case study.

According to Junior et al. (2015, pp. 233-234) the transformation Rio de Janeiro has gone through preparing for the MSEs, has cleaned out the urban poor that could not pay for the new standards of FIFA and International Olympic Committee (IOC). Even though many of Rio de Janeiro's favelas have been under threat of eviction for many years, Gaffney (2013, p. 1) claims that the World Cup and the Olympics accelerated the process. Arrigoitia (2017, p. 74) agrees by calling it a new wave of government enforced evictions with a discourse of progress, growth and development, something referred to as 'generalization of gentrification' which I will elaborate more on in the theory chapter of this thesis. The forced evictions were legalized when the old houses were declared not fit for living or in risky areas.

1.1. Kind of a Master Plan?

One third of the world's urban population live in slums (Davis, 2007, p. 23). In Rio de Janeiro 24 percent of the residents, live in a favela. This equals around 1.5 million people (CatComm, 2015). Favela is the term used for informal settlements in Brazil. As one of the countries with the highest income and social right inequalities, there is no surprise that Brazil has a large part of their citizens living in favelas. Favelas are seen as obstacles for the representation of cities

hosting MSEs because they are physically in the way of constructing plans, or are simply ‘ugly’ to look at (Steinbrink, 2013, pp. 131-132). In the next chapter, I will elaborate on slums and favelas.

The economic crisis in the 1980’s and 1990’s affected Rio de Janeiro severely. As a result, poverty and insecurity increased. In 2001 the City Statute allowed cities to create their own Master Plans independent from the federal state (Avritzer, 2009, p. 2). When the Master Plan is put aside for other strategic plans with little citizen participation, the municipality of Rio de Janeiro created a strategy where MSEs were used to turn the economic situation of the city, with the objective of making Rio de Janeiro a “global city” (Braathen et al., 2014). Using MSEs as a urban political strategy started in 1993, bringing the shift from welfare approaches to policies for urban economic development, where entrepreneurial instruments were introduced in the city’s first strategic plan (Silvestre & Oliveira, 2012, p. 204).

The political ambition of the bidding for hosting FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Summer Olympics in 2016, was for Brazil and Rio de Janeiro to be acknowledged as a “superpower” and a “global city” (Dupont, Jordhus-Lier, Braathen, & Sutherland, 2016, p. 188; Gaffney, 2013, p. 13). After losing the bidding for the Olympic Games twice, the government hoped that by successfully hosting the PAN American games in 2007 would show the IOC that Brazil was ready to host the largest MSE in the world. And in 2009 Rio de Janeiro was awarded the 2016 Summer Olympics (Silvestre & Oliveira, 2012, p. 204). This was during the President Lula da Silva’s presidency (2003-2011), and enthusiasm was big for becoming an economic and political “superpower” (Gaffney, 2013, p. 13). When the IOC on October the 2d 2009 awarded the Summer Olympics 2016 Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilians thought they finally had gained acceptance as a global economy (Rohter, 2010, p. 223).

The global organizations of MSEs, like FIFA and IOC get exclusive rights to the host cities, and large urban development projects are implemented. It is possible for states to give MSEs what they demand due to factors, like available resources, the city’s aim at becoming “global”, and weak institutions, prevent the state to protect human- and environmental rights of the city (Braathen et al., 2014). “*Local authorities are promoting these mega events as an opportunity to increase the global competitiveness of the city*” (Saborio, 2013, p. 130). MSEs are instruments for promoting the city in the global market, Steinbrink (2013, p. 131) calls this the ‘*festivalisation*’ of the globalization process. There is one outward objective; to gain recognition

in the global market, and one inward objective; to promote urban development or large-scale projects. The pressure on politicians and planners in host-countries usually affect the outcome of development and the priorities normally end up as short-term effects. The investments made in preparing the arenas do not benefit the whole population (C. M. Sørbøe, 2013) due to poor communication between the government and the citizens in Rio de Janeiro about urban planning of the city. MSEs are utilized by neoliberal capitalist's gain which does not benefit the social welfare of the population (Millington & Darnell, 2014, p. 191). Consequently, the poorest residents are not included in development. The priorities turns into a competition between entering the global market versus the citizen's needs (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 131).

In the biddings to FIFA and the IOC, the government promised to upgrade old constructions and develop new infrastructure in hosting cities to match international standards. For Rio de Janeiro this meant massive changes in infrastructure and huge expenditures on roads, transport systems, sports arenas and security, mostly benefitting the elite (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 74). The preparation for the latest MSEs in Rio de Janeiro has drained money from public spending, by focusing on expanding investments in urban development and infrastructure through measures like Private-Public Partnership (PPP), with exception of fees for developers and forced eviction of low-income settlements from the city centre (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 74). Only 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used on education, and 3.77 percent of GDP on healthcare. There was spent more on the preparations for the 2014 World Cup in Rio de Janeiro than for the three last World Cups combined, 65 percent more than estimated in the original plan (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 187-188).

To make space for the new urban plans of the city, many people were evicted from their homes. In the period before the World Cup and the Olympic games, more than forty-thousand people were threatened by forced evicted due to infrastructural projects preparing for the MSEs (Braathen et al., 2014; Gaffney, 2013). Forced evictions in Rio de Janeiro and other hosting cities in Brazil have been directly linked to MSEs, and justified (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 74) in the name of the Olympics or FIFA. For easier capital flow and attracting foreign direct investments, exceptions in legislations is given to successfully host MSEs. This is called 'state of exception'. State of exception is a strategy that allows for something otherwise not possible, in the name of for example MSEs. Laws are made effective just for a specific period of time to implement the MSEs. It can, for example be deregulation policies based on demands of labour flexibility, or

restrictions on accumulations that gains the governments capital accumulation (Saborio, 2013, p. 137).

Whole communities have been forcibly evicted from areas attractive for hosting MSEs. People are unfairly treated but are not muted, and resistance through social mobilizations has been seen throughout Rio de Janeiro since the city was awarded the Summer Olympics. This is exemplified through the mass-protests of June 2013, when a new social mobilization in Brazil was born; popular resistance against lack of participation, corruption and poor quality of housing, education and healthcare (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 75). As a result of more frequent eviction of favela communities, effective community associations have created new spaces for participation (Braathen, May, Ulriksen, & Wright, 2016, p. 161). The lack of formal space of participation in the preparation process, has been the key to social mobilization in Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 162). Community associations have been important for activities that increases group gains, however these mobilizations do not normally have impact on poverty reduction. These community-based organizations are usually concerned with immediate issues and needs, and rarely look into wider concerns of the community because of limited access to social, political and legal forums (Devas, 2004, pp. 64-66).

It is difficult for community-based organizations to develop long-term strategies that can be used for social justice in situations of crisis (Gaffney, 2013, p. 14), like forced evictions where the residents are given a few days notice, as we will see was the case for Metrô Mangueira. The urban development of Rio de Janeiro has exclusively benefited the elites with unequal distribution of territory between the social classes where many have been relocated to the urban peripheries. Increases in real estate prices has also forced urban poor to move out of the city centre (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 75). I will take a closer look at this situation after presenting the main objectives of the research and the research questions in the next section of this chapter.

1.2.Main objective(s)

The main objectives of this thesis is to explore the importance of MSEs like the World Cup 2014 and Summer Olympics 2016, on city planning in Rio de Janeiro, using experiences from the favela of Metrô Mangueira. I want to look at experiences and understandings of the former residents of Metrô Mangueira on social, economic and political possibilities before, during and after the evictions. Further, I would like to find out to what degree people living in Mangueira

I and II feel they have had the opportunity to participate in the planning processes for Metrô Mangueira. Lastly, I want to explore in what way the residents managed to change of resettlement plans.

1.3. Research questions

What are the experiences of the residents of Mangueira I and II, concerning the social situation and democratic involvement before, during and after the forced evictions from Metrô Mangueira?

- I. In what way have Mega-Sports Events affected urban development in Metrô Mangueira, and how can these changes be explained in a gentrification perspective?
- II. How did the residents of Metrô Mangueira experience the process around the evictions?
- III. In what way did the residents of Metrô Mangueira participate in the planning before, during and after the resettlements from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira I and II?
- IV. How and in what sense have the residents of Metrô Mangueira managed to influence the plans of resettlement?

I use the term experiences to refer to how the former residents of Metrô Mangueira understand and remember the situation before, during and after the resettlements to the housing complexes of Mangueira I and II. Slums dwellers have been discriminated against for centuries, and is one of the reasons I have chosen not to use the term *slum* in my empirical findings. As Holston (2009b, p. 249) states, there are problems of homogenizing and stigmatizing the urban population with terms like *slums*, therefore I have chosen to use the term *favela* which is the term used for the Brazilian informal settlements, in which I come back to later in my thesis. Still I find it useful to use the term *slum* to describe the global phenomenon in the introduction of this thesis.

2. Mega-Sports Events, Democracy and Social Justice

Mega-Sports Events (MSE) are international large-scale sportive events, that have been used strategically by the Brazilian authorities in urban planning with a view to gentrifying Rio de Janeiro in an attempt to become a “global city”. In this chapter, I will present some background information about mega-events, Brazilian and local democracy and the social situation in Brazil

in addition to a very short introduction to the site of my case study, which we will revert to in later chapters of this thesis.

2.1.Mega-Sports Events

There are four constructive dimensions of mega-events: the visitor attractiveness of the event, the media coverage, costs of hosting the event and the transformative impact of the event. The World Cup and Summer Olympics are typical MSEs (Müller, 2015, p. 627). These MSEs attract visitors from within the country and abroad. International media outlets cover all events before and during the events, and is one of the IOC requirements that the host city must have full media coverage (Müller, 2015, pp. 628-630). The costs of hosting the events are extremely high. The last dimension is urban transformation, which may be the biggest spending and impact of the mega-event. Host cities may use MSEs strategically to develop infrastructure not possible otherwise, due to the international federations and their legacies, justifying the high cost and the speed of the development. The consequences are often gentrification and dislocation of urban poor (Müller, 2015, pp. 632-633).

MSEs offer opportunities for developing economies to showcase sustainable socioeconomic development in host cities (Darnell, 2012, p. 882). Brazil used the national decline in poverty to show the IOC that the country was working its way out of poverty and climbing the economic ladder. One of the IOC's objectives is to contribute to sustainable and equitable change for all citizens in host cities. At the time of the bidding, Brazil was an emerging world economic power, and IOC offered Rio de Janeiro opportunities of socioeconomic improvements by awarding the city the 2016 Olympic Games (Darnell, 2012, pp. 869-870). By hosting MSEs, the city highlights its development opportunities, as new liberal markets are opened and more investments being made in public spaces (Darnell, 2012, pp. 872-873). The IOC's recommendations for host city developments are Northern-led top-down development strategies that focus on the international perspectives and – as a result – easily neglect social issues (Darnell, 2012, p. 876). Developing countries with high levels of inequalities may miss the opportunity to establish long-term human security, which is one of the aims of such development (Darnell, 2012, p. 882).

The Brazilian government's decisions are influenced by a multilevel governance system based on a hierarchical system. This hierarchical system is structured with the international and global

at the top, the Brazilian federal state in the middle and the population at the bottom (MacLeod, 2001, p. 814; Pike, Rodriguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2006, p. 144). The international sports federations, such as FIFA and IOC, tend to enter this hierarchical system from the side, at a level somewhere in between the federal state and the citizens, creating a 'state of exception', interrupting the possible connection the state has with its citizens and vice versa, hence denying people access to alternative options. Figure 1 shows how the MSEs interrupt the connection the state has with its citizens. The reversed pyramid shows the division of power and influence. The state strives for international recognition and the politics are affected by this. When hosting MSEs, the urban policies and planning follows the requirements of the international sports federations and considerations for the citizens' needs are interrupted, as demonstrated in figure 1 where one of the blocks in the reversed pyramid is disconnected from the citizens creating imbalance in the hierarchical system.

Figure 1: Hierarchical system of MSEs




Figure 1: Imbalance in the hierarchical system of MSEs

A classical problem is when more stakeholders are included in decision-making and policy constituency, in such a scenario, modifications may take place and the result changes. A process with too many participants in an unstructured setting that can lead to corporatist participation, where governments repress local participation (Brinkerhoff & Crossby, 2002, pp. 59-61). Brazil changed in just a few decades from an authoritarian regime to participatory democracy, and is well known for its participatory institutions (Avritzer, 2009, p. 1; Braathen et al., 2014). Unfortunately, participation has been weaker in Rio de Janeiro than in other Brazilian cities (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 162). The government values the global image of the country more than the needs of the population, and therefore repress local voices. This can lead to negative impact on policy implementation and governance (Brinkerhoff & Crossby, 2002, pp. 59-61). As figure 1 demonstrates, the structurally destructive nature of MSEs denies the citizens access

to democratic participation, thereby denying them choice. Urban planning has happened without democratic participation of the urban poor, and the state did not expect the poor to resist.

2.1.1. Effects of MSEs in Rio de Janeiro

The Rio 2016 Official Development Prospect stated that the Olympic Games 2016, together with the 2014 FIFA World Cup, was part of a broader development plan that would benefit the city and all its residents. This shows how the MSEs are directly linked to the development agenda of the city of Rio de Janeiro and how the international MSEs organisations gain access to funds and social development in the host city (Darnell, 2012, p. 877). Further, The Rio 2016 Official Development Prospect promised improved infrastructure, increased investments in the economy, partnership and higher economic activity, with social inclusion also being important in this document. Underlying this is the understanding that the improvements made due to the MSEs have been more for show than for the well-being of urban dwellers (Darnell, 2012, pp. 878-879).

When it comes to the latest MSEs in Brazil, there have, according to Campos and Resende (2014, p. 5); (Saborio, 2013, p. 135), been limited democratic processes or dialogue between the government and the population about decisions on how to spend public money. The Brazilian agency working the budget for the Olympic Games 2016 was a joint-venture between the federal government and the municipality called the Public Olympic Authority. The Olympic plan included huge urban infrastructural changes in Rio de Janeiro to meet the IOC's demands. An unselected Brazilian Olympic Committee and the Public Olympic Authority formed the Olympic plan. Even though the '*Legacy Plan*' for FIFA and IOC was to develop social and environmental improvements for the well-being of the population of Rio de Janeiro, economic, social and environmental factors were not equally balanced, and therefore they did not meet the requirements of the MSEs (Saborio, 2013, pp. 135-136).

Communities have had limited room for contributing to the development process (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 160-161). The big urban infrastructural development projects are shaped by political, legal and institutional rationales (Nuijten, 2013, p. 15), and not by the need of the urban poor. Gentrification of large parts of Rio de Janeiro was started and forced removals became more frequent after 2009, as part of the preparations for MSEs. The implementation of

a new transport system in Rio de Janeiro has been one of the main reasons people have been forced to move (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 159) in addition to gentrification of inner-city areas and areas near sportive arenas.

Large amount of public expenditure on preparations for MSEs to improve social welfare, has not proven to have benefited the urban poor (Minneart (2012) in Saborio, 2013, p. 135). 90 per cent of the funds spent for the World Cup and the Olympic Games came from the public sector, but almost all of the profits went to FIFA, the IOC and the private sector. This is part of the reasons why Brazil has seen such a plethora of social mobilization during the last decades, collective action taken by urban poor and the working class demonstrating for a place in democracy and a right to the city, which I will revert to shortly in this chapter.

Increased international cooperation between social mobilizations in Latin America has given the mobilizers more support and more information about human rights and how to claim these rights. The linkages between International Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Social Movements during the 1990's have strengthen the social mobilizations in Brazil, and the rest of Latin America (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 4). The basis of many demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro has been the people's dissatisfaction with public spending on MSEs when basic needs of the city's population are lacking. The mobilizers are demanding cheaper public transport fees, basic sanitation, better quality and standard of health and education services, higher salaries, an end to corruption, and an end to forced evictions (Campos & Resende, 2014, pp. 3, 5; Dupont et al., 2016, p. 187). A frequently used slogan has been "*FIFA standards for education, health and security*" (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 187). Many peaceful demonstrations were met by rubber bullets, batons and tear gas by the military police (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 187).

The former President Dilma stated in a speech on national television after the massive protests in June 2013 that not much of the national budgets was used on the preparations for MSEs (SocialistProject, 2013). In addition, she applauded that the citizens used their democratic rights and promised better effort to improve the education and health sector and more invites to citizen participation in future policy making (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 189). According to the SocialistProject (2013) she partly told the truth and partly lied in her speech because she did not mention how much of the state and municipal budgets where spent on the large new stadiums and infrastructures. She also did not mention the exceptions the federal government

made for the preparations, such as tax exemption for the construction firms, and allowing surplus spending for MSEs, a violation of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (SocialistProject, 2013).

Dupont et al. (2016, p. 188) states that the demonstrations of June 2013 were not against the MSEs itself, but the lacking transparency in using use of public money, increasing costs for the citizens and the forced evictions. According to C. Sørbye (2016), the non-existing democratic arena for governance in Brazil has made people mobilize and used occupations and demonstrations as tools of making their voices heard. The spontaneous demonstrations created foundation for other protests and social mobilizations in Brazil in the years to follow. These social mobilizations have challenged the political institutions and created new forms of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro especially, but also elsewhere in Brazil (C. Sørbye, 2016).

2.2.Democracy in Brazil

Brazil is the largest country in Latin America, with a population of almost 206 million people. In 1822, Brazil became an independent monarchy, following centuries of colonial rule under Portugal. The abolition of slavery in 1888 marked the transition to the Republic. In 1985, the military dictatorship ended and democracy was introduced, beginning with the first elected president. The economy has grown steadily since 2003 and until 2013 Brazil was seen as a strong emerging country. Since 2013, Brazil has experienced rising inflation, economic decline, and an increase in unemployment rates, as well as one of history's biggest political corruption scandals.

Brazil is a federal state with a popularly elected President holding highest political office. At the federal level there is a national assembly with Chamber of Deputies and a Senate (Berg, 2014). Further, Brazil is divided into 26 states in addition to Brasilia, which is a Federal district. Each of these states has a governor and a legislative assembly. At the local level, cities are managed by a mayor and municipal secretaries that supports the city administration in the different fields of work (Berg, 2014; I. N.-R. d. Janeiro, 2014) The municipalities are to some degree self-organized and are responsible for urban development and other local interests (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, pp. 7-8). One of the Municipal Secretaries in Rio de Janeiro is the Secretariat of Housing (Secretario de Habitação) that was established in 1993, and is responsible for housing policies in Rio de Janeiro.

The post-colonial state of Brazil had not served the poor, but rather benefited the middle class and the elite (Davis, 2007, p. 69). In the 1970's and 1980's a combination of high debt, bad planning and corruption created a debt crisis in Latin America. International economic organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put high pressure on countries to pay their debts. This meant opening up for free markets and capitalistic Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Implementation of SAP meant governing the use of public spending, less on education and public health, and privatization of large part of this sector as a part of the neoliberal politics (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, pp. 5-6). IMF was supposed to re-stimulate and regulate global financial flows (Smith, 2002, p. 432). The neoliberal policies is blamed by its critics for leaving large parts of the populations living below the poverty line (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, pp. 5-6).

Urbanization and democratization was implemented as part of the World Bank's and IMF's programs in Latin America (Davis, 2007, p. 70; Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 12). In the late 1980's the World Bank and IMF privatized the housing markets in many countries through SAP (Davis, 2007, p. 71). During the time SAP was controlling the spending of public money, the real estate market was privatized, and can partly be held responsible for the high real estate taxes we find today (Davis, 2007, p. 68). In the period 1972-1990, the World Bank worked on in-situ slum upgrading, creating direct patronage relations between the World Bank and the neighbourhoods (Davis, 2007, p. 70).

The historical and environmental history of clientelism in Brazil is hard to replace with participatory democracy (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 5), and many see what the politicians do for them as gifts, not as rights (Nuijten, 2013, pp. 11-12, 14). Participation is seen as important for development because consulting stakeholders improves the quality and sustainability of development (Brinkerhoff & Crossby, 2002, pp. 52-52, 55). There is a gap between democratic procedures in principle and practice, meaning there is still corruption, institutional racism and so on, keeping the state from upholding the laws in many situations (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 15). According to Campos and Resende (2014, p. 4), the Brazilian democracy is constructed on institutions and practices in favour of the elite's interests and not the well-being of the whole population. In addition, for the government to legitimize their decisions and improve policies, majority approval and minority participation has been an effective strategy. Many attempts of participatory process in Brazil has been cover-ups of decisions already decided by the government (Campos & Resende, 2014, p. 4).

2.2.1. The Right to the City

Urban poor all over the world, especially in Latin America and Brazil, have used the right to the city to claim new citizen rights in legal, ethical and performative terms according to their struggles for dignity, security and mobility (Holston, 2009b, pp. 247-248). In 1967 Henri Lefebvre published his theory of the “*Right to the City*”, which emerged from the struggles for the right to daily life in the city for the urban poor in France (Holston, 2009b, p. 247). The right to the city was created from what Turner (1997, p. 15) calls active citizenship. According to Lefebvre, the right to the city is claims by citizens to end exclusion and to gain access to urban space (Holston, 2009b, p. 247). It is the right to develop the city according to desire (Braathen et al., 2014). Right to the city and participation is seen as social rights, rather than political (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 197). Lefebvre explained in 1967 that the right to the city was cries and demands. Harvey (2012, p. x) later explained the cry as the crises of everyday urban life and the demands as the creation of an alternative urban life, or access to equal rights.

“The right to the city has to be constructed not as a right to that which already exist, but as a right to rebuild and re-create the city as a socialist body politic in a completely different image – one that eradicates poverty and social inequality, and one that heals the wounds of disastrous environmental degradation” (Harvey, 2012, p. 138).

The urban space is human made, and has been changed many times throughout history. “*If our urban world has been imagined and made then it can be re-imagined and re-made*” (Harvey, 2003, p. 941). Urbanization and democratization has made it for new forms of citizenship and rights to be formatted (Holston, 2011, p. 336). Democratization has contributed to the formation of new forms of citizenship because of people’s easier access to knowledge and network. The urban poor mobilize and generate new forms of citizenship for participation and inclusion (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 187). One alternative space of expression used to claim rights to the city, is what Holston refers to as spaces of insurgent citizenship, which I will explain in the theory chapter.

The right to the city was acknowledged in the Brazilian law after massive social movements, with linkages to politicians, claiming their rights to urban space and to the city. In 1983 Lionel Brizola from the Democratic Labour Party became the mayor of Rio de Janeiro and together

with social movements, his political party managed to influence the integration of the Right to the City in Brazilian laws (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 146-149). In 1988 the Constitution recognized the rights of all citizens to the urban sphere and implemented the *Right to the City*, which was approved in 2001 (Avritzer, 2009, p. 2; Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 48-149). Even though the right to the city is recognized in the Brazilian institutional framework, it has hardly been fulfilled. Even though the democracy in Brazil has not worked to its fullest potential, it has opened up for citizen participation to some degree in the country (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 3).

2.3.Social Justice and Inequality in Rio de Janeiro

In spite of neo-liberal economic globalization Brazil has seen good results on poverty reduction through pro-poor strategies (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 146). There has been a significant reduction in low-income households after President Lula increased the minimum wages. In 1995, 23 percent of the Brazilian population lived in economic poverty, while in 2009 the numbers was reduced to 12 percent (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 146). There are two forms of poverty; absolute poverty which is inadequate income to afford minimum level of nutrition and other basic needs, and relative poverty that is the distribution of national income (Devas, 2004, pp. 16-17). Poverty includes more than just low-income or lack of income. Access to housing, health care, participation in decision-making and access to the urban sphere is also aspects of poverty. To understand vulnerability of the poor, it is important to look at the social aspects as well as income (Devas, 2004, pp. 55-56).

Table 1: Proportion of households living in poverty, 2009

	Income poverty	Housing precariousness
Brazil	12%	13%
Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region	10%	20%

Table 2: Proportion of households living in poverty, 2009. Taken from Braathen et al. (2016, p. 146)

Even though the popular politics of President Lula halved the extreme poverty in the country, 80 percent of its population still lives in favelas. Even so, more than 20 percent lives in non-economic poverty, with bad social services and exclusion from transport and basic services like sanitation and housing entitlements (Braathen et al., 2014; Dupont et al., 2016, p. 188). Even though economic poverty is reduced, other poverty aspects, is still a problem, especially in large cities like Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 46). Table 2 shows numbers from 2009, the

percentage of income poverty, people earning less than the minimum salary and thereby living under the poverty line. The percentage of housing precariousness, which is seen as people living in favelas and other informal settlements. When looking at poverty as housing precariousness we see that the percentage in Rio de Janeiro is higher than when only looking at income poverty. Poverty can also include bad transport systems, social exclusion and other aspects. According to Braathen (2016, p. 32), income poverty has been significantly reduced while non-monetary poverty has seen smaller changes.

2.3.1. Favelas

In the 1950's, for the first time ever, slums were recognised as a global problem. One of the first definitions of a slum was an area populated by criminals with dirty, unhealthy conditions (Davis, 2007, pp. 21-22). The first slum area of the world was developed in Rio de Janeiro in the 1880's (Davis, 2007, p. 23). In 2010, almost one and a half million people (Hurrell, 2011), one out of every six resident of Rio de Janeiro was living in a favela (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 132).

Favela is the term used for informal settlements in Brazil. Favelas has gone from being slums to become urban villages with varied income levels (Cummings, 2015, p. 81). They are informal settlements on public or private land that started out by being occupied by roof-less people. The first reasons there was developed favelas in Brazilian cities, according to Xavier and Magalhães (2003, pp. 8-9), was the abolition of slavery. Later, increasing immigration to the cities, crisis in rural areas and evictions of urban poor from areas of interest for the government created favelas in new places. People need places to live and the favelas are more affordable, and therefore the favelas grow. High prices of urban land and urban exclusion forces poor people to occupy land illegally. Favelas were established close to the city centre where the job opportunities existed (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, pp. 11, 17), but have extended to peripheries as the cities has expanded.

Historically, the hills of Rio de Janeiro were less attractive because of the difficulties of building on the hillsides. Therefore, many of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro are located on these hills. Many third world states, Brazil included, are in constant conflict with the poor. The first gentrification process recognized in Rio de Janeiro was in the first half of the twenties century. The Brazilian government wanted to change the standard of the city according to a European model and ended up evicting many urban poor from the city centre. This early process of

gentrification left thousands of people homeless (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 11). During the military dictatorship, Rio de Janeiro's favelas were targets for forced removals as a part of state strategies. The aim was to eliminate all favelas in Rio de Janeiro in one decade. There was a boom of forced eviction in Rio de Janeiro in the 1970's due to increased land value, and the government aimed at building a modern city (Davis, 2007, pp. 99, 108). Many favelas in Rio de Janeiro was located near the city centre, because it had not been lucrative for the government to remove them, as the major part of the workers for the industries in the centre lived in these favelas (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 12).

The dictatorship evicted more than 140,000 people in Rio de Janeiro alone, creating a huge conflict between the state, the police and favela dwellers. The evicted had to leave their homes with little or no compensation (Davis, 2007, pp. 99, 108). After the dictatorship ended in the 1980's, forced evictions went down and new pro-poor strategies and programs were implemented (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 159), this was an temporary opportunity for the urban poor to access land in the city (Davis, 2007, p. 59). After the dictatorship and a period of hyperinflation, the Brazilian economy grew fast, increasing urban development and investments. State-led urban restructure opened up for gentrification, firstly due to improved security and upgrading programs like federal housing programs, such as Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV), which I will elaborate more on later in this thesis. The growing real estate and rental prices in Rio de Janeiro, is evident as the formal housing cost doubled between 2008 and 2012 (Cummings, 2015, pp. 82, 95).

Improved economic conditions in Brazil has increased the development of formal housing in the city centre of large cities, in which also contributed to even more urbanization and growing favelas (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1135). Table 1 shows the growth of the urban population in Rio de Janeiro from 1950 – 2015 and the estimated growth until 2030. The growth of favelas has followed the growth rate of the city as many newcomers settle in favelas, as the real estate prices are affordable. Formal settlements in Rio de Janeiro are connected to government provided infrastructure and services, while informal settlements, are lacking basic services (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1135) and owner rights to land.

Globalization can cause mobilizations of people wanting better, services and access to information around the urban centre (Davis, 2007, pp. 10-11). Even though there has not been created enough jobs in the cities for all immigrants, it has not slowed the flows of immigration

to larger urban spaces. During the economic crisis in Brazil, the immigration flow kept its speed. People immigrating to the cities built informal houses (Davis, 2007, pp. 14-17) in the hillsides of Rio de Janeiro, extending or creating new favelas in search of affordable homes.

Table 2: Rio de Janeiro Population Growth

YEAR	POPULATION	GROWTH RATE (%)	GROWTH
1950	3,026,000	0.00%	0
1955	3,687,000	21.80%	661,000
1960	4,493,000	21.90%	806,000
1965	5,523,000	22.90%	1,030,000
1970	6,791,000	23.00%	1,268,000
1975	7,733,000	13.90%	942,000
1980	8,784,000	13.60%	1,051,000
1985	9,242,000	5.20%	458,000
1990	9,697,000	4.90%	455,000
1995	10,432,000	7.60%	735,000
2000	11,307,000	8.40%	875,000
2005	11,832,000	4.60%	525,000
2010	12,374,000	4.60%	542,000
2015	12,902,000	4.30%	528,000
2017	13,063,000	1.20%	161,000
2020	13,326,000	2.00%	263,000
2025	13,789,000	3.50%	463,000
2030	14,174,000	2.80%	385,000

Table 1: Population Rio de Janeiro; retrieved from Review (2016).

As industrialization continued and urbanization was strong, favelas were removed to make space for new businesses and the upper class. Many moved to the peripheries of the city when the new highway came, linking the city centre with the peripheries. Little development had happened in the centre, but the value of land had increased (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 12). Favelas especially in areas of high value land, are seen as urban problems, and was the reason for the slum clearance policies of the 1960's to the 1980's (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 16). The 1980's saw its first urbanization or in-situ upgrading of favelas (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 16).

2.3.2. Security

Many favelas in Rio de Janeiro are not safe for people to walk into without being invited by residents of the favela. Criminal gangs have taken over the governments' responsibilities of

providing services in the favelas. The culture in the favelas is that the criminals takes care of the favela dwellers and helps them when needed. In that way, the favela dwellers are protected inside the favela, but the dwellers also have to stay loyal to the criminals. This information was passed to me on 1st of February 2017, on a walk around Morro da Conceição, one of Rio de Janeiro's *safer* favelas. The criminal gangs are in constant war with the military police, and the norm, for the criminals as well as for the police, is kill first – ask later! In Rio de Janeiro, there are killings every day, and most of them are criminals by the police or visa-versa.

The brutal police violence in Brazil is, according to SocialistProject (2013) the legacy from the military dictatorship. The criminalization of the poor, makes it difficult for favela dwellers to acquire jobs because of where they live (Nuijten, 2013, p. 13). The police often see all favela dwellers as criminals and the dwellers do not feel protected by the presence of the police. The criminalization of the poor limits the opportunities of work and education. Favela dwellers are afraid of violence from the police as well as from the criminals. They often end up in the middle of fire exchange between the police and the criminals (Nuijten, 2013, p. 13). After the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP), the Police Pacification Unit, withdraw their presence in many of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, the crime rates has increased, as well as street robberies. Figure 2 demonstrates that street robberies has increased with almost 50 percent in just one year after the World Cup, from 2015 to 2016.

Figure 2: Street robberies are up 48% from 2015-2016




Figure 2: Increase in street robberies in Rio de Janeiro from 2015-2016. Taken from (Carless, 2016).

The aim of the UPP is to secure public security for all members of the community. They want to make it possible for the government, local and national, to have direct contact with local

organisations and communities. The UPP was set up by the Secretariat for Public Security in Rio de Janeiro at the end of 2008 in one of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, to take control over the areas run by the criminal gangs. (UPP, 2017b). Between 2009 – 2011 UPP was installed in 20 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, to bring the police closer to people and eliminating the criminals control over the favelas.

According to Saborio (2013, pp. 132-133) there is another objective to the UPPs pacification. UPP was first installed in the favelas close to the rich and tourist areas, and around the arenas hosting FIFA World Cup and Summer Olympics (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 150-151). This has created an 'urban security belt', which surrounds the sports arenas, tourist attractions and access points of public transports (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017), linking the pacification to the gentrification of the same areas. However, this does not include the most dangerous favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and ensures therefore mostly the safety of visitors and elites, not the majority of citizens (Saborio, 2013, pp. 133, 138). UPP has a direct link with MSEs and is a strategic action in providing security to elites and tourists, according to IOC standards.

“Rio de Janeiro is a tale of two cities. On the one hand, the glitz and glamour designed to impress the world and on the other, a city marked by repressive police interventions that are decimating a significant part of a generation of young, black and poor men” (Atila Roque, Director at Amnesty International Brazil. In Amnesty, 2015).

In 2014, 38 UPP unites were covering twenty favelas complexes in Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 151-152; UPP, 2017b). Even though UPP has used methods that infringes human rights, there have been some positive effects on security in the city, which have resulted in increased tourism and economic growth. In addition to rise in real estate market. Negative effects as repercussions has occurred, as urban poor moving because of higher rent and increasing prices (Saborio, 2013, pp. 137-138). In the pacified favelas private companies have replaced illegal and dangerous power, water and TV-connections, and for those who can afford it this is a good change, but for the poorest it means moving to even worse conditions (Saborio, 2013, p. 139). In November 2011 UPP was installed in Mangueira (UPP, 2017a). In this period, there was an acceleration of police violence in Mangueira (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017). After a few years of UPP being present in Mangueira, many residents agree that it became safer to walk around inside the favela because of UPPs presence (Junior et al., 2015, p. 245). During this time, it was not normal to see armed criminals inside the favela.

2.3.3. Minha Casa Minha Vida – the Federal Housing Project

Federal housing projects have been directed to low income people through the production of new houses, re-urbanization of favelas and resettlement of people living in risk-areas (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 21). The Federal Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) was the first housing programme initiated by the Lula Government. During the period 2007-2010, 67 percent of PACs funding's went to housing development within communities, and 6 percent to resettle citizens to other parts of the cities. President Lula and the Worker's Party, invested in large-scale housing and infrastructural projects. They created the Ministry of Cities and Federal- and State Councils, which has resulted in higher public participation, and new housing- and sanitation programmes (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 149). Even though Lula's days as president seemed to have had positive effects for urban poor, in the aftermath, it seems like the upgrading programs have turned out to be traditional urban house developments with limited community participation. The top-down implementation of the poverty reduction programs have contributed to poverty reduction in the cities but an increase in the peripheries.

In 2008 MCMV was created for low-income families with the aim of supporting job creation and reinforcing economic activity (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 149-150). MCMV is a federal low-income housing project, under PAC, devised by the Ministry of Cities, to create economic activity and an increase in the work force throughout the population (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 75; Braathen et al., 2016, p. 149). MCMV offers better standards of housing and home-ownership. This housing project, with other similar projects in Brazil, trying to change living norms of urban poor, provide risk-free homes and basic services, and to change the perception of the favela dwellers from criminals to lawful citizens (Nuijten, 2013, pp. 9,16). In Rio de Janeiro 100.000 new housing units were planned for resettle citizens due to environmental risk-areas and preparations for MSEs (Braathen et al., 2016, pp. 149-150).

MCMV is based on Private-Public Partnership (PPP) where the projects are presented by private firms to the federal governmental bank; Caixa Econômica Federal, from now on, referred to as Caixa. With the support from the local government, the federal governments funds the projects, but the local government has the responsibility of implementing the project and collaborating with the private firm (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 150).

In 2009, Eduardo Paes became Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, and in 2010 he implemented a new housing project called '*Morar Carioca*' (Carioca² Living). The aim of Morar Carioca was to upgrade all favelas in Rio de Janeiro by 2020, as the social legacy of hosting FIFA World Cup and Summer Olympics. The program administration stated that it would upgrade the houses inside the favelas, public space and resettle residents living in environmental risk-areas (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 150). In the original plans for Morar Carioca, community participation was important for the project's success. Thus, in 2013 the contract with the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) controlling community participation was ended, taking away peoples possibility to participate in urban planning of their neighbourhoods. To be able to create housing for resettled people, Morar Carioca started collaborating with MCMV and PAC (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 151).

The spatial layout of favelas and the criminalization of favela dwellers make them issues of security. Favelas challenge the power and control of the State, the housing programs is therefore the states attempts of regaining control (Nuijten, 2013, pp. 9-10). Arrigoitia (2017, p. 76) states that the problems with the implementation of MCMV is inadequate information and compensation before and after moving to a MCMV project; it provides limited access to participation in urban planning and there are no alternatives that give the families possibilities to choose the best options for their family situation. According to Braathen et al. (2016, p. 151) there is a mismatch of numbers of people being removed and the number of new housing units created. The number of families at Metrô Mangueira receiving apartments from MCMV does not match the amount of families that lived there. Many of the new house units are built in the peripheries of the city, far from the original favelas, with poor infrastructure and bad transport systems. Moving there has resulted in many losing their jobs, the distance to school and health centres makes it difficult to attend, in addition to losing their ties and networks of friends and family in the old neighbourhoods.

In short, the removals in Rio de Janeiro the last decade, is not the in-situ rehabilitation that PAC aimed at, but resembles more the drastic removal policies from the military dictatorship. Urban poor who are offered new housing through MCMV are moved to the periphery strategically, and the development plans for the urban areas are created for the privileged as the State favours the urban rich above the needs of the urban poor (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 76). Pushing urban poor

² "*Carioca*" is the term of people from Rio de Janeiro. Cariocas are very proud of being cariocas.

out of the city centre increases socio-spatial segregation (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 151), and increases the poverty in the peripheries.

2.4.Metrô Mangueira

Maracanã and around has experienced massive gentrification since the the preparations for the Pan American Games held in 2007. Even though Maracanã football stadium was upgraded for the Pan American Games just a few years before, large amount of money was spent on upgrading Maracanã for the World Cup and the Summer Olympics. The gentrification of the area around Maracanã, as for example the metro station and the Maracanã train station that got entrances from both sides of the road, the Maracanã side and the Mangueira side, which made the connection to the city centre easier for all the residents of the complex of Mangueira. The state evicted many families around Maracanã stadium for real estate and other gentrification projects as well as for the sake of visibility. Metrô Mangueira was one of areas suffering under these circumstances.

Metrô Mangueira looks like a stripe of informal housing, creating a community, by the metro line, 500 meters from the Maracanã football stadium (Junior et al., 2015, p. 236) used for the final games of FIFA World Cup, and for the opening and closing show at the Summer Olympics 2016. In other words, a very important stadium for the global impression of Rio de Janeiro in becoming a “global city”. Metrô Mangueira is an extension of the complex of Mangueira. Mangueira is located in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro, and the complex consist of many smaller favelas that has grown together in size and placement. The complex of Mangueira is a merging of the favelas; Chale, Buraco Quente, Olaria, Vila Esperança, Telégrafos, Três Tombos, Pedra, Caboclo, Parwue Candelária, Bartolomeu Gusmão, Lotamento (EMOP, 2014) and Metrô Mangueira.

The government does not see Metrô Mangueira as a part of the complex of Mangueira because the plans were to erase the small neighbourhood. Both the former residents of Metrô Mangueira and the people living in the complex of Mangueira agree that Metrô Mangueira is a part of the complex. Figure 3 is a map of Mangueira and around, and it shows the distance between Metrô Mangueira (marked in blue), Complex of Mangueira (marked in red), Mangueira I and II (marked in yellow) and Maracanã football stadium (marked in green), which is all important for the understanding of the situation of Metrô Mangueira. On the map, you can see that Metrô

Mangueira is physically divided from the complex of Mangueira by the train lines. In the left corner of the map you can see the metro station of Triagem, where almost 100 residents from Metrô Mangueira were evicted as well.

Figure 3: Map of Mangueira and around




Figure 3: Map of Maracanã and around. Retrieved from (Mangueira. Image. GoogleMaps, 2017a). Metrô Mangueira (marked in blue), Complexo de Mangueira (marked in red), Mangueira I and II (marked in yellow) and Maracanã football stadium (marked in green).

Workers on the railway started to settle at Metrô Mangueira in the 1970's. In 1984 the occupation was intense, and caused the recognition of the favela (Junior et al., 2015, p. 236). Before the removals started in 2010 there were approximately 700 families living there, today there are around 100-150 new families occupying the remaining houses.

In July 2010, people from the government entered Metrô Mangueira and filmed in- and outside the houses. In August 2010 the houses were marked with ‘SMH’ and a number of eviction. The space was to be cleared for bus parking for the Maracanã football stadium (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 98; Junior et al., 2015, p. 237). Two weeks later the residents were informed that they had three options; to move to housing offered from the federal housing project, MCMV in Cosmos, live in shelters, or living on the streets (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 98).

The families that lived at Metrô Mangueira, were resettled to new housing sites in several rounds (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 98). All families were first offered housing in Cosmos, 70 km from Metrô Mangueira almost four hours away, 108 families accepted this after feeling the pressure, afraid their families would end up in the streets (Junior et al., 2015, pp. 238-239). Another 22 families moved to similar offers in Santa Cruz, also in the distant periphery of the city (Magalhães, 2015). Some of the residents were afraid this was their only option and did not want to risk the chance of their children growing up without roof over their heads, and therefore accepted the new apartments in Cosmos and Santa Cruz. The rest of the residents did not accept the far-away housing projects and asked for help from public defenders and the “*Pastoral das Favelas*”, a catholic network (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 99).

Figure 4: Street view of the layout of Metrô Mangueira in 2016



Figure 4: Retrieved from (Street View: 758 Av. Radial Oeste. Image. GoogleMaps, 2016)

Immediately after the families were resettled, the local government demolished the houses at Metrô Mangueira as a strategy to put pressure on the families that did not accept their offer. It is what Dupont et al. (2016, p. 202) calls scattered removals, when not all residents are evicted at the same time. Houses are demolished in between other houses, creating holes in the neighbourhood appearance. Looking at Figure 4 you can see the layout of the neighbourhood of Metrô Mangueira in 2016. The demolished houses becomes an area of trash and rats, creating unhealthy living conditions for the residents left behind. After the first families moved out and their houses was demolished, the committee of Metrô Mangueira was created and thereafter took the leading role of the mobilization (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 99).

With support from the public defenders, the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and other similar communities, the committee of Metrô Mangueira managed to get another alternative offer from the government. This is quite interesting, since many communities have not managed to change the plans of the municipality. When people demonstrated, military police were sent in, and it ended in violent confrontations between the police and the residents (Junior et al., 2015, p. 240). Through their strong mobilizations, the citizens of Metrô Mangueira managed alternative offers from the authorities, in what follows I will briefly talk about Mangueira I and II before we look more explicit on gentrification, social mobilization and citizenship in the theory chapter.

After almost two years of struggles at Metrô Mangueira, MCMV offered housing in Mangueira I and II for the residents of Metrô Mangueira, these were constructed in two rounds, and was ready for receiving new residents in January 2011 and in December 2012 (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 98; Social, 2012). In February 2011, 246 families was resettled from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira I, located 350 meter from the original community (Junior et al., 2015). In February 2012, 92 families accepted offers of housing in Triagem, about 2 km from Metrô Mangueira. And the last 216 families finally got their new apartments in Mangueira II in December 2012 (Junior et al., 2015, pp. 238-239), after more than two years of fighting with the municipality, for their rights of living close to their original homes. In the analysis of this thesis I am discussing to what degree MSEs has affected the process, and if the process can be related to gentrification theory. The outcomes if this process is seen as a form of expressing insurgent citizenship using invented spaces of social mobilization created by the residents of Metrô Mangueira.

3. Theory

To explore what urban developments led to the evictions of Metrô Mangueira, how the residents reacted to the new situation and how they managed to get new and better offers of housing, I have chosen to use theories of gentrification, social mobilization and citizenship. Gentrification, to explain the process of urban development in Rio de Janeiro and the effects gentrification can have on local communities. How social mobilization and the use of invented spaces have impacted citizenship and the creation of new forms of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro. Later, in the analysis, I will use these theories to explain the situation of forced evictions from Metrô Mangueira, how they managed to change the plans of removals to Mangueira I and II and how this is linked with Rio de Janeiro's preparation for hosting two large Mega-Sports Events (MSE), the World Cup 2014 and the Summer Olympics 2016.

3.1. Gentrification

Gentrification theory has since the 1980's been conflicted between two principal theoretical perspectives: liberal humanists; based on culture, consumption and demand, with David Lay in the lead and structural Marxists; explaining gentrification with capital, class, production and supply with Neil Smith as the main driver (Hamnett, 1991, pp. 173-175).

The main characteristic of Lay's theory of gentrification is the creation of possible gentrifiers. The process of gentrification starts with a change in industry and lifestyle, which leads to the creation of possible gentrifies, a group of people demanding new or renewed urban housing and spaces (Hamnett, 1991, pp. 176-177). According to Lay's theory, the possible gentrifiers are the most important for gentrification process to start. "*Changes in the social and spatial division of labour and on the supply of potential gentrifiers. These changes underpin the development of a new culture and the residential and political demands that follow from it*" (Lay in Hamnett, 1991, p. 178).

Smith argues that the main driver for gentrification is profit, and his theory of the 'rent gap' explains that when the ground rent of a place is less than the potential ground rent, gentrification can occur when the rent gap is large enough to endure profit (Hamnett, 1991, pp. 178-179). Particularly, gentrification occurs in the inner city, where the rent gap is the greatest and the highest return is available (Smith, 1979, p. 546).

“Gentrification is a structural product of the land and housing markets. Capital flows where the rate of return is highest, and the movement of capital to the suburbs along with the continual depreciation of inner city capital, eventually produces the rent gap. When this gap grows sufficiently large, rehabilitation can begin to challenge the rates of return available elsewhere and capital flows back” (Smith, 1979, p. 546).

According to Smith (1979, p. 542), gentrification is the same as capital revaluation to increase capital flow, and argues that there are four categories vital to the land and house value, that is the value of the property, the sales price, the ground rent and the potential ground rent. The rent gap is the divide between the actual ground rent and the potential ground rent after gentrification. Urban development is most likely to create a rent gap because of the increased value of urban land. Gentrification occurs when the rent gap is wide and by renewing and selling rehabilitated neighbourhoods there will be profit by the end of the day (Smith, 1979, p. 545). According to Smith’s theory of the rent gap, there are three types of gentrification developers. There are the house sharks that buy the houses, renew them and sell them for profit, the second is middle or upper class that buys a house cheap and transforms it to their own modern house, and the last one is people buying houses, modernize it and rents it out (Smith, 1979, p. 546). The potential for gentrification is higher in areas with larger rent gaps, but it is not given that a location with high rent gap will be gentrified (Smith, 1987, p. 464). It is important to look at both consumption and production to explain gentrification, where consumption is the social aspects while production is the rent gap (Smith, 1987, p. 464).

Neither Lay’s or Smith’s theory can explain gentrification alone. According to Hamnett (1991, pp. 186-187) a combination of the two theories and maybe more are required for explaining gentrification in some places. A comprehensive, integrated explanation of gentrification combines Smith’s theory of the rent gap and Lay’s theory of creation of possible gentrifiers. There needs to be a creation of possible gentrifiers, people wanting to buy, then an attractive area with a rent gap, and collective social actors, like real estate agents, urban developers, financiers, etc. that are willing to invest in the area. The gentrified area does not have to be the area with the highest rent gap, it depends on the groups, the gentrifiers’, preferences (Hamnett, 1991, pp. 187-188). As I will explore more in the analysis, the gentrifiers in Rio de Janeiro the latest decades have been the elite, the middle class and an increasing international interest in the real estate market.

According to Smith (1987, p. 462), Lay's definition of gentrification; changes in occupation and education, the transformation of inner city neighbourhoods to middle and upper class residential, is too marginal, focusing only on social change. Smith (1987, p. 464) argues that a combination of social, economic, political and spatial changes needs to be examined to understand the process of gentrification. Still, Smith keeps a firm hand on the theory of the rent gap as the most important to understand and explain gentrification (Smith, 2002, p. 446). For the renewal of a neighbourhood to occur, there has to be capital investments in the gentrifying process, which again leads to social change in the area. Where there is an increase in income and rent becomes a target for gentrification, but it is not certain that gentrification will occur (Smith, 1987, pp. 463-464).

The indicators that separate social class can vary in different countries or cities, like income, education or other indicators. It is therefore important to look at the specific place and choose indicators thereafter. Lay defends his social understanding of gentrification with the explanation of cultural capital of the new creative class. Social capital can be equally important as economic capital (Reply: The Rent Gap Revisited Smith, 1987, p. 465). According to Lay (in Smith, 2002, p. 432), Smith claims that all cultures was hybrid before the 1980's therefore not useful to explain the globalization process, but can however be useful in looking at the new wave of gentrification.

3.1.1. Waves of gentrification

Historically there have been three waves of gentrification, mainly recognized in Europe and North America, with different amount of state involvement in the processes. The first wave during the late 1960's and the 1970's, was characterized by sporadic gentrification. There was little state involvement, therefor class specific, where only the elite had the opportunity to buy in gentrified areas. The first wave of gentrification pushed the working class out of the inner city and as a result, they had to move further from their workplace. In the mid to late 1970's the economic crisis and international competition slowed the gentrification process (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, pp. 466,468, 469).

The second wave of gentrification blossomed from the late 1970's, after the end of the economic crisis, implementing far-reach strategies for attracting investments. The neighbourhoods gentrified in the second wave were close to central business districts, due to less risk in investments (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, pp. 466,468, 469). The end of the 1970's and the

beginning of the 1980's saw a new path of gentrification, as globalization became stronger, the first "global cities" emerged (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, pp. 466, 468), which leads us to the third wave of gentrification.

The third wave happened after a pause of gentrification in the late 1980's to early 1990's. According to Hackworth and Smith (2001, p. 468) there are four ways of gentrification in the third wave. One is that larger parts of the inner city are gentrified, not just living areas, but also urban space, and the process expands to more remote areas. The second way includes that globalization increased the involvement of large developers in the gentrification process. These developers are often the first to invest in a neighbourhood, and then smaller developers follow.

The third way of gentrification in the third wave is the declining resistance from the local communities towards gentrification of neighbourhoods. This is because the working class more likely could afford investing in the more remote gentrified areas. The forth and the last includes more state involvement in the gentrification process to decrease risk for developers. The third wave of gentrification was characterized by increased risk due to investments further from central business districts, thus the need for more state assistance to take the risk down. The assistance from the state came in for example federal funding, tax-brakes and loans (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, pp. 466, 468-470, 472). In other words, gentrification in the third wave has been driven by more powerful investors with state support, and less opposition from communities. The third wave of gentrification was first recognised in Rio de Janeiro in the first half of the twenties century.

A gentrified area has characteristics like cafés, expensive stores, new architecture and new residential design, which changes the look of public space (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1134), beautiful streets, shopping malls or avenues and rich cultural offers. Artists often occupy places looked at as poor, and affordable. Artists are rich on cultural capital but choose to live in poverty, still they form a new cultural middle class (Ley, 2003, pp. 2527, 2533). Access to public space and culture has become an important strategy to gentrification (Lysgård, 2012, p. 1283), and the right to the city. There has been a change from cities of industry to cities of service and culture. Culture and entertainment creates a new form of consumption where culture is the product. Culture are used as an internal sociocultural process to develop a common identity and pride among the citizens and to attract tourists and investments for economic growth (Lysgård, 2012, p. 1285). Culture has been an important strategy to attract investments, tourists, new citizens

and labour force (Lysgård, 2012, p. 1284). The favelas in Rio de Janeiro are rich on culture and has become a target of gentrification as the international market has showed an increased interest for real estate in these cultural areas. New middle- or high-income people move in and the culture of the neighbourhood might change (Sutton, 2014). Gentrification of the favelas contributes to the loss of valuable culture as the poor move out and the criminal gangs financing for example funk parties are pushed away (Cummings, 2015, pp. 92-93).

The combination of rich cultural capital, poor economic capital and *a fit into* the dominant class in society creates a relationship between the two types of capital and the inner city land market. The inner city poor areas where the artists live tend to become highly fashionable and wanted areas for the middle- and upper-classes. In that sense the cultural class tend to contribute to the gentrification process as gentrification develop on areas rich on cultural capital (Ley, 2003, pp. 2533-2534, 2536), and possible future profit. If a place is successfully gentrified, it can translate to gentrification of the surrounding neighbourhoods as well (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, p. 473). The third wave of gentrification has been visible in developing countries as well as in Europe and in North America.

3.1.2. ‘Generalization of gentrification’: Gentrification in Urban Planning

Davis (2007, pp. 2-5) predicts that 95 percent of all human development will occur in cities in the future. The majority of people in the world are living in urban cities already. A consequence of the massive urbanization is inequality in and between cities. Researchers from the UN state that there has not been sufficient planning of accommodation for the urban growth the world has witnessed and can anticipate in their future (Davis, 2007, p. 7). Economic growth in the city centre force people to move to the peripheries where they create new urban spaces. The urban centre is expanding, and the periphery is becoming a part of the urban city (Davis, 2007, pp. 10-11).

Cities are becoming more self-governed and private property and free markets are the drivers for neoliberal urbanism (Smith, 2002, p. 429). Globalization has shifted from focusing on the nation to focus on specific cities or places. Foreign direct investments and movement of capital in between markets has created “global cities” (Smith, 2002, p. 430), as the urban is being redefined as the global (Smith, 2002, p. 431). Gentrification has become a global urban strategy that expresses consumption of neoliberal urbanism driven by property claims via state donation to the housing markets (Smith, 2002, p. 446).

There has been a shift from the third wave of gentrification to gentrification included in urban planning and process. According to Lees and Ley (2008, p. 2381) it seems like policy makers have forgotten how slum clearance destroyed communities when they now use gentrification in the new public policies. State-led gentrification is promoted as community regeneration, and other terms that makes the process seem more positive and possible than with the term gentrification (Slater, 2015). Many policy planners prefer to use the term ‘regeneration’ instead of gentrification, because of the negative linkages to displacement with the term gentrification. The planners uses terms like social balance to sell the idea of regeneration, even though the result often are community degeneration, demolition of residential areas and displacement of urban poor. This results in concentration of middle- and upper-classes in the new central gentrified areas (Smith, 2002, p. 445). Inner city is used for marked transition erasing welfare and contributing to increased inequality in society (Lees & Ley, 2008, p. 2381). Gentrification have left thousands of people homeless, to keep capital flowing (Harvey, 2015).

Gentrification was a process normally found in the large cities in North America and Europe, today it is a global phenomenon, and can be found in various cities of different sizes all over the world. Gentrification has undergone a rapid transformation from a marginal urban process to a contemporary urban process included in large urban development plans (Smith, 2002, p. 439). Gentrification happens in different ways throughout the world, and there are different characteristics of gentrification, which I will elaborate on a little later. Normally, there is a relation between gentrification, global capital and tourism. Rio de Janeiro have included gentrification in large development plans preparing for MSEs, aiming at becoming a “global city”. The process of gentrification is usually is based on collaborations of Private-Public Partnership (PPP) and liberal urban policy in city planning (Smith, 2002, pp. 440-441).

“Gentrification as urban strategy weaves global financial markets together with large- and medium-sized real-estate developers, local merchants, and property agents with brand-name retailers, all lubricated by city and local governments for whom beneficent social outcomes are now assumed to derive from the market rather than from its regulations. Most crucial, real-estate development becomes a centrepiece of the city’s productive economy, an end in itself, justified by appeals to jobs, taxes and tourism” (Smith, 2002, p. 443).

Gentrification has become a part of public policy in many countries and cities. The changes from the third wave of gentrification is where gentrification has actively been used in public policy and planning (Lees & Ley, 2008, pp. 2379-2380), as seen in the Rio 2016 Official Development Prospect. Might this be an emerging fourth wave of gentrification recognisable in several cities across the globe? The relationship between gentrification, globalization, neo-liberalism and public policy has brought about a state-led gentrification that seem to be displacing many urban poor (Lees & Ley, 2008, pp. 2379-2380). In the first wave of gentrification, the process was seen more as a problem than a solution to urban development, therefore the state included creation of housing for poor (Lees & Ley, 2008, pp. 2379-2380). In the 21st century states are using gentrification in urban development policies to increase investments, economic growth and in becoming “global cities”.

The renewal of working-class areas in the inner city, included in urban planning is what Smith (2002, pp. 437-439) calls the ‘*generalization of gentrification*’. ‘Generalization of gentrification’ refers to a new global urban strategy including the new luxury of the inner city renewal and urbanization of the peripheries. Once the gentrification process starts it rapidly spreads around the area and urban poor are replaced with middle- and upper-class residents (Smith, 2002, pp. 437-438). The mayor change in gentrification is that gentrification is integrated in government’s urban planning, before it was not state-led but wishes of the middle- and upper-class for renewed areas (Smith, 2002, p. 439), with or without state support. Today the state pushes forward gentrification.

To understand ‘generalization of gentrification’ there are five interrelated characteristics worth taking a closer look at. The first is the changing role of the state. States are using gentrification more actively in their urban planning policies, which contributes to less risk for the urban developers because of increased state investment in the process. This leads us to the second characteristic of ‘generalization of gentrification’, which is more collaboration of PPP in urban planning, free markets and global capital flows. The third is a rising trend of social movements to resist the effects of gentrification and resettlements of urban poor, which was the case for Metrô Mangueira, as I will elaborate in future chapters.

Forth, gentrification spreads to more distant places like the suburbs of the city. Gentrification of whole areas is the fifth and last characteristic, where gentrification includes new complexes of consumption, production and pleasure as well as new, modern, safe homes. Gentrification

has become an urban strategy to accumulate capital and compete with other urban economies (Smith, 2002, pp. 441-443). The massive changes in Rio de Janeiro's inner city and around the sportive arenas, has spread to the nearby places as well. The impacts it has had on urban poor's livelihood have led to a new decade of social mobilizations where urban poor are demanding democratic participation in the planning process, and better standard of basic services.

3.1.3. Increased demand for Security

As criminal rates grow, demands for more secure houses increase. A new trend of gentrification is high secure Gated Communities (GCs) that are walled-in housing developments denying public access, with private collective management responsibilities for the maintenance of common areas. The newly developed housing in many "global cities", have limited public access and increased security measures with security staff or advanced surveillance equipment (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, pp. 177-178). GCs represent private interest and a dynamic real estate business with high capital return (Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 355), which fits into Lay's theory of the creation of possible gentrifiers and Smith's theory about the rent gap. Normally, there is a variety of service offers inside or close by these GCs. The legal framework of GCs is that the maintenance and common services as for example rubbish collection is privately financed (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, p. 177), the state does not provide these services inside GCs.

According to Atkinson and Blandy (2005, p. 178) there are three main reasons people choose to live in GCs, and that is fear of crime, wanting more privacy in the urban landscape and the status of affording living in these closed condominiums. GC respond to social conflict of everyday struggles by offering a sense of security from crime, but at the same time GCs represent a new urban lifestyle influenced by globalization (Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 355) and is the gentrified style of Rio de Janeiro's high-class residents. Fear of crime in Latin America is strong due to increasing violence and crime rates, and might be the reason for the increased demand for safe homes, and the GC boom in many Latin American cities in the latest decades (Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 356). The inner city of Rio de Janeiro is no exception, GCs, called '*condumínios fechados*³' in Portuguese, have become a characteristic of the new gentrified areas.

³ Closed condominiums / Gated communities

Globalization has created self-organized cities that compete with other cities. By being more self-driven, cities create new social identities that the residents can relate to (Smith, 2002, p. 436). People living in GCs are attempting to exclude themselves from a wider neighbourhood, or exclude others from accessing urban space. There is argued that GCs is attempts of finding like-minded people with the same beliefs and values (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, pp. 178-179). *“The group-specific place of everyday activities of the privileged are mainly concentrated in access-controlled enclaves (housing ghettos, shopping centres, business parks)”* (Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 357). When new GCs are built, follow-up projects of gentrification for the surrounding area makes the access to other goods of the “global city” easy (Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 357).

GCs creates differences between people that can afford security, and the ones that cannot (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, p. 178). Massive development of GCs have impacts on social segregation of urban poor as well as on security for the less privileged. Areas with many GCs are characterized with secure housing possibilities and a wide possibility of shopping and leisure. The development of GCs push the urban poor out of these areas to more remote places with less security and poorer access to health, education and work opportunities (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, pp. 178-179; Coy & Pöhler, 2002, p. 356). In other words, GCs are the typical physical appearances of a gentrified area in many large cities around the world, but are in many cases a hinder for social inclusion. Displacement of crime is another factor caused by the GC boom, making the already vulnerable urban poor more exposed to crime. A third factor of GCs is the privatization of services that makes it more difficult for urban poor to access social services normally provided by the state (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, p. 185).

3.1.4. Gentrification and Urban Poor

Since the 1950's, capitalists have been stating that free markets would end poverty, but has demonstrated the opposite, that free markets are for people that can afford it, rich investments, reinvestments and become richer and urban poor getting poorer (Harvey, 2003, p. 940). As Marxist thinking say; we live in a society depending on endless economic growth (Harvey, 2015). Gentrification is a renewing process of parts of urban space (Smith, 1979, p. 536) that involves removal of a groups of people from one social class by a wealthier. It is an instrument of accumulation of new forms of governance, economic- (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1134) and consumption culture.

In the places where gentrification only occurs in parts of the neighbourhood, as in the first wave of gentrification, it has resulted in both direct and indirect consequences on low-income citizens. The indirect forms of displacement are when urban poor staying behind in the gentrified area feels isolated and ends up leaving because the neighbourhood feels unfamiliar, or as a result of the increased real estate prices, they cannot afford the new costs of living and are eventually dislocated (Sutton, 2014). Forced removals are direct consequences of gentrification. Communities are resettled to new locations to make space for new urban plans of gentrification. The space is used for another purpose than it was originally, or for upgrading the standard for wealthier families to move in (Sutton, 2014). The most common use of gentrification is creating upgraded residential areas, but as we will see in the case of Metrô Mangueira, gentrification can be strategic plans of beautification of international important areas.

Many criticize gentrification for displacing low-income families by renewing neighbourhoods, attracting business and capital flows, causing increased real estate and consumption prices urban poor cannot afford. High-income families invest in poor areas, taking advantage of the low real estate prices for their own gain (Sutton, 2014). The challenge for gentrification is the urban poor, considered to be in the way of gentrification plans. For the plans to move forward, urban poor are evicted from their homes, and as a result their vulnerability increases (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, p. 468). As the urban areas expand to the suburbs, the rising prices of the city centre also expand, and the poor that moved to the outskirts due to low prices are forced to move even further away (Davis, 2007, p. 92). Urban poor have for centuries been evicted, relocated and evicted again to make space for the elite and middle classes (Davis, 2007, pp. 101-102). Many people living in informal settlements, therefore live in constant fear of forced evictions (Davis, 2007, p. 92).

3.2.Social Mobilization

When livelihoods are interfered by outsiders, fears of losing what they have, make people form civic networks and mobilize to resist the changes. When the social contract between the civic and state is broken, the people protest to regain the right to the city. Social movements can force the authorities to respond to the claims for resources and rights to meet their needs for basic needs or rights to the city. This process of change may have consequences for urban poor and

citizenship. The claims social mobilizations put forward are normally specific and concerns their needs or situations threatening their daily life (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, pp. 197-198).

The reaction to interference in a community that may threaten to change the daily life of the residents can trigger social mobilizations. Normally, social mobilizations are small grassroot based, self-defined, with or without support from civil society organizations (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 185-186). Most social mobilization are non-institutional organized, or less organized, collective attempts to challenge the authorities, but can also be institutionalized with NGO's, or other institutions organizing or helping the movement to create a platform to reach the authorities. The most normal driver for social mobilization is informal networks with the same believes and issues, and use of protests or resilience to change a situation or prevent something from happening (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 185-186). The force behind such movements is the hope that social process can change rights and visa-versa (Harvey, 2003, p. 940).

The main characteristic of social mobilization is collective actions (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 192) to trigger change. Collective actions is based on individual understanding of the matter in focus (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 194), and when more people have the same understanding, civic networks can blossom. Collective actions are attempts to change the current social situation or to make sure it does not become worse (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 3). There are several forms of social mobilizations; it can be well-established movements, or temporary according to situations occurring in society or in the local community (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 185). "*Social mobilization is a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population*" (Deutsch, 1961, p. 493). According to Deutsch (1961, p. 494) there are two stages of the social mobilization process; first, peoples living conditions are threatened or they are forced out of their old ways of living, and second they are put into a new setting where new patterns of living are created. If external interventions disrupt everyday life, and even threatens the residents in informal settlements with evictions, they tend not to remain passive (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 198), they organize to various degrees and resists the changes.

Social mobilizations are organized around normal life, it is about coping and claiming rights to basic needs (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 192), but can also be a reaction to new situations and new ways of living (Deutsch, 1961, p. 494). Many social mobilizations occur due to lack of information from the government to citizens about plans that will affect their lives (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 203). Social mobilization consist of informal networks of people with the same

belief or issues that lacks possibilities to participate in democratic decision making, and takes the action to the streets (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 186). The main characteristic of a social movement is not the process of collective action in itself, but the idea of resistance to trigger change (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 186). Normally, everyday life is not about social mobilization, but external interventions or threats can trigger unplanned social mobilization (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 192).

An important key to the growing importance of social mobilizations are the increased international networks that provides information exchange and support from transnational networks and organizations (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 3). International media attention on social mobilizations have given the movements new platforms and possibilities of change. Other, similar movements in other parts of the city, cities or countries, NGO's and other nation states can provide support to the movements and increase the pressure on the authorities or the leaders of the firm, government or whom the other side of the mobilization might be.

Due to the development I the social mobilization at Metrô Mangueira, I have decided to look at the modalities Dupont et al. (2016, p. 197) mentions. The first is everyday resilience that refers to the everyday practices dwellers in informal settlements do to improve their daily life. Individual or collective efforts to access basic services are an examples of everyday resilience. The second modality is confrontational mobilization and the use of invented spaces for participation. When favela dwellers are threatened by external interruptions, protests are actively used as attempts of changing the agenda and getting their claims heard. For a mobilization to be sustainable beyond the reaction to external intervention, organized structures, vertical- and horizontal linkages with strategic actors outside the community, and strong neighbourhood councils, committees or associations create resourceful knowledge and networks that can successfully change the agenda (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 197-198). According to Dupont et al. (2016, p. 198) the capacity to create alliances with different types of actors outside the neighbourhood is essential for successful social mobilization.

The third modality is use of the judicial system. Protective laws used as instruments to defend their rights require actors with knowledge of how to use the judicial system. The use of laws as instruments in mobilizations can create more interaction between the state and the mobilizers (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 199-200). Cooperation between the state and the mobilizers is the forth modality Dupont et al. (2016, pp. 200-201) mentions. When social mobilizers participate in

‘invited spaces’ it is important to consider the possibilities for successfully influence or if it is a way for the state to weaken the mobilization. If the mobilizers are sceptical to the state’s motives, the actions will rather find place within ‘invented spaces’.

The fifth is division of collective action that can arise due to various factors. When forced eviction is a threat, division of actions can occur due to for example different offers or when some families have more to lose than others due to more investments, or when just some parts of the settlement are threatened. This can create competition between the favela dwellers, or individual agreements between the dwellers and the state. Fear of violence related to mobilization can also create division of active mobilizers. The last modality is weak mobilizations where citizens tend to be passive or less active when external intervention disrupts their daily life. The reason some does not mobilize, even though threatened by evictions, may be related to lack of knowledge and socioeconomic difficulties (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 201-203). In the next part of this chapter, I am presenting theories of citizenship and how they can be used by urban poor to express their beliefs and claims.

3.3.Citizenship

According to Holston and Appadurai (1996, p. 188) the dominant citizenship should be a universal nation state created citizenship, but urban movements have been the core for changing citizenship. Globalization and democratization create new spaces for urban dwellers to mobilize. People living in urban areas are normally more affected by differences in citizenship, it is therefore more normal to find social mobilizations claiming rights to the city and access to resources in cities (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, pp. 188-189, 196). Social movements can lead to processes of change, which again can create new forms of citizenship (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 188). Citizenship may create a common form of solidarity in a political community that levels out the differences between social classes, through the redistribution of benefits from economic growth. Inflation and corruption also have negative effects on the distribution of goods, and therefore as well on citizenship (Turner, 1997, pp. 8, 11).

“People have rights to a minimum standard of living which does not depend on their relative economic or market worth but on their absolute rights as citizens to a measure of economic well-being and dignity” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 197).

There are many definitions of citizenship, but to be able to look at changing forms of citizenships, I will focus the definitions of formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship is membership to a state, yet not a guarantee of inclusion. Formal citizenship is the membership to a state that could provide a common sense of values, culture and identity. Access to rights require formal citizenship, but Holston and Appadurai (1996, p. 190) argues that formal citizenship is not enough. Substantive citizenship is a status that entails people rights, duties and resources (Braathen et al., 2014; Holston, 2012, p. 50), and includes access to political, civil, economic and cultural rights, even though not always equal. Common foundation of citizenship should give different ethical and social groups access to resources which makes cultural diversity possible (Turner, 1997, p. 10), but many states do not provide sufficient substantive citizenship due to the unequal opportunities for citizens within a society (Holston, 2012, p. 50).

There are different forms and theories of citizenship. Liberal citizenship theory is about giving all citizens the same liberty and equal rights to provide what they need for themselves, not providing the ‘good life’ for the citizens. Nations of liberal citizenship has been criticized for creating ideal citizenship, and are based on one type of citizens, normally the elite and upper-class, which creates exclusion of citizens who are less well-off (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 193). The exclusion of rights can be due to differences related to class-, sexual- or religious practices not acknowledged by the nation-state (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190). Citizenship is historically specific and changes over time and space, different forms of citizenship may therefore function differently according to institutional strategies, social, engineering and citizenship claims at the specific time and place of study (Blokland, Hentschel, Holm, Lebuhn, & Margalit, 2015, p. 659). Due to the history and formation of citizenship in Brazil, I have chosen to focus on the following forms of citizenship; urban-, differentiated- and insurgent citizenship.

3.3.1. Urban Citizenship

In addition to the formal citizenship to a nation state, it is normal to be member of a municipality or other legal division of a country with different policies within this space. As city-regions are expanding and the government’s responsibility is getting larger, in some regions with millions of citizens. The size and the way the region is managed by its politicians and leaders shapes the citizens’ rights, possibilities and identities. Rules, norms and development may differ from the

federal state as the policies are implemented (Yiftachel, 2015, p. 734). Urban citizenship is about more than just membership to a state, it is about right to the city, and claims for rights through the city (Blockland, Hentschel, Holm, Lebuhn, & Margalit, 2015, p. 656). In this way, urban citizenship is important for defining citizens' rights and possibilities for participation, in addition to access city resources (Yiftachel, 2015, pp. 734-735).

Urban citizenship take shape through struggles for urban space and resources and creates new urban identities (Yiftachel, 2015, p. 728). The city is used as a stage for social mobilization to achieve urban rights if they are not met by the governments (Blokland et al., 2015, p. 656). As explained earlier in this thesis, the right to the city is the struggles for better quality of life and more equal access to city space and resources. With other words, the right to the city is about the urban citizens and their opportunities to participate in the creation of the city. According to Blokland et al. (2015, p. 658) the right to the city is not about the decisions the state makes but about the decisions that produces and forms urban space. Yiftachel (2015, p. 729) does not mean that urban struggles protects urban citizenship, but can benefit a particular group in society. Social mobilizations in Rio de Janeiro has proven to be able to affect the creation of the city and thereby also the right to the city in some instances through invented spaces, which I will come back to later in this chapter.

3.3.2. Differentiated Citizenship

Brazil has been characterized by differentiated citizenship and inequality throughout history. Differentiated citizenship is characterized with unequal distribution of rights that contributes to the depression of for example social classes (Holston, 2011, p. 338). Identities are often used in protest, resilience and social mobilizations. Terms like '*us*', the favela dwellers, and '*them*', the authorities (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 195), have been used to make the differentiated citizenship visible in movements. There are many adjectives used to define differentiated citizenship, like second-rate citizens, non-citizens and so on. The definitions all include the fact that some citizens in the society are marginalized by discrimination, exclusion or have fewer rights than other citizens (Nuijten, 2013, p. 11). Differences in class and cultures within a state can be the ground for differentiated citizenship.

“Differentiated citizenship that uses these social qualifications to organize its political, civil, and social dimensions and to regulate its distribution of inequalities. The

citizenship system thus created was universally inclusive in membership but massively inequalitarian in distribution” (Holston, 2009b, p. 255).

Holston (2011, pp. 338-339) claims that there is a need of a combination of political view of citizenship as duties and rights, with the history of the country, to explain differentiated citizenship. Acceptance and justification of differentiated citizenship and inequality in different forms, contributes to renewed and reinforced inequalities (Holston, 2011, pp. 339-340). In other worlds, citizenship inequality and differentiated citizenship create and reinforce social inequality and is, to some degree, because it is socially accepted due to its history in the Brazilian society. These inequalities can be segregated access to rights and basic needs and different treatment among citizens (Holston, 2011, p. 341). Social mobilizations where citizens are claiming equal rights, and to create their own arenas from claiming these rights through the creation of insurgent citizenship has challenged the legalization of differentiated citizenship in Brazil (Holston, 2011, p. 342).

3.3.3. Insurgent Citizenship

Society and citizenship changes over time depending on situations and its members. In the modern society, with the mixture of people with different cultures, ways of living, beliefs, norms, and so on, new insurgent citizenships can emerge, as old ones dies out. Normally, insurgent identity can be created in sites where people’s expectations to the state is not fulfilled, or where human rights is not provided. With that in mind, both rich and poor neighbourhoods can represent spaces of insurgent citizenship, even though it is mostly found in poorer areas. Agents of insurgent citizenship in poor neighbourhoods strive for the right to a dignified daily life, and focus on basic and social needs as housing, security, health and education, but can also be triggered by events like threats of evictions. The practises created in these spaces normally disturb the state or the history of the city (Holston, 2011, p. 343; 2012, pp. 48-50). Holston (2012, p. 39) argues that the modern space for citizenship right is the state, and spaces of insurgent citizenship is new forums, created by citizens excluded from other forums, trying to create alternative futures and new sources of legitimacy.

The working class and the urban poor have created new forms of citizenship, what Holston (2009b, p. 245) refers to as *insurgent citizenship*. Insurgent citizenship can be the national effects of citizens action for future human rights (Braathen et al., 2014). The political

transformation that happens when residents, collectively demand more equal rights (Holston, 2011, p. 336) where democratic arenas are not offered. The condition of informal residents and on-going struggle of urban life, make residents mobilize to claim their rights to access resources and urban space by collectively claim their rights (Harvey, 2012, p. xii; Nuijten, 2013, p. 11). If the state does not provide any platforms for these mobilizations to speak their minds, there is a possibility of creating insurgent citizenship (Blokland et al., 2015, p. 657; Holston, 2011, p. 342). According to Holston (2009b, p. 257), urban insurgent citizenship is when they all refer to the city and is developed under four main conditions. These conditions are;

“when urban residence is the basis of mobilization; the agenda of mobilization is about ‘rights to the city’; when the city is the primary political community of comparison for the developments; and when residents legitimate their contributions to the city itself” (Holston, 2009b, p. 257).

People creating insurgent citizenship are normally urban poor experiencing citizenship inequality or differentiated citizenship, and struggle over rights and duties linked with the membership to a state (Holston, 2009b, p. 248; 2012, p. 47). Insurgent citizenship consists of active citizens fighting for civil, political, economic and social rights, and wish for inclusion, in addition to formal citizenship (Braathen et al., 2014; Holston, 2009b, p. 245). Insurgent citizenship work against the old development practices where they are excluded and distribution of rights are unequal, towards new development practices of inclusion (Holston, 2009b, p. 246; 2012, p. 53), as we will see in the context of the struggles of Metrô Mangueira in later chapters.

3.3.3.1. Invited and Invented Spaces

When citizens want to make their demands reacted upon and there are no democratic space for participation, the citizens need to find other platforms for their claims. Democracy is about participation, but participation may not always be possible for all citizens. Invited spaces is where governments or other external agents invite citizens to participate. When urban poor do not have any forum for participation, the statement of their claims or dissatisfactions create new urban spaces, called invented spaces. These are spaces where citizens create their own opportunities and engagement for participation to make their voices heard. Invented spaces are normally within communities, but can also be taken to larger arenas through civic networks (Braathen et al., 2014; Dupont et al., 2016, p. 196). Invented spaces of citizenship is what Holston calls spaces of insurgent citizenship (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 196). The use of invented

spaces by collective actions, to make their demands heard or to claim their rights, can put pressure on governments (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 205), and contribute to change.

Invented spaces are generally controlled by social mobilizations but can also be used by NGO's. The resistance and demand for inclusion can move across invented and invited spaces according to the phases of the mobilization (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 196). For example, a social mobilization using an invented space to get the authorities attention can be successful in the way that they are invited to a space of participation. Who is included in participation practices varies in places and time, and to analyse this it is important to look at the three who; who participate, who defines the agenda and who sets the rules. This will shed a light on where some are included and some are not (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 196). This might be a way of seeing differentiated citizenship. Insurgencies and social mobilizations tend to be more common in places where democratic participation is limited (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 5), as at Metrô Mangueira where the citizens did not have the opportunity to participate in the planning process of *Maracanã and around* (Dupont et al., 2016, pp. 192-193).

3.4. Linking Gentrification, Social Mobilization and Citizenship

Groups of people establish civic networks of insurgent citizenship and use new, invented spaces, created by citizens themselves for participation, making an effort to be included in society, or resisting changes occurring due to gentrification of the city. These new identities of insurgency concentrating on problems with belonging to a society (Holston, 2012, p. 49). This can be unequal access to housing, differentiated citizenship and uneven distribution of rights and services (Holston, 2009b, p. 256). The civic networks make the ground for social mobilizations where the civil society are trying to be heard, using arenas of for example external political events to claim their rights to the city (Braathen et al., 2014) and resist the effects of gentrification that threatens their daily life.

The logic of using these three theories; gentrification, social mobilization and citizenship to look at the situation of one specific favela in Rio de Janeiro is this: Gentrification is a renewal process of the urban landscape, which is criticised for removing low-income people to make space for new urban development plans. This process creates dissatisfaction in the urban population, which makes people create civic networks to mobilize. The social mobilizations are created of groups of people with the same problems or life situations, and want to create social

change in form of more equal citizenship and the right to the city. These are the motivations for social movements to change citizenship by making the authorities reconsider plans and policies.

In societies with limited participatory possibilities, the urban poor have to create their own spaces to get their voices heard, that eventually can lead to social change, and changing forms of citizenship. This can create insurgent citizenship, as the case with Metrô Manguera suggests. Figure 5 demonstrates the linkage from gentrification to social mobilization to citizenship, which again affects the gentrification processes. In short, when implementing gentrification processes in urban planning, removal of urban poor occurs in direct or indirect ways. The limited possibilities urban poor have to participate in the planning processes trigger social mobilization that might use invented spaces for claiming rights and can result in changing citizenship. In some cases, as we will see in the case of Metro Manguera, insurgent citizenship emerges when authorities have to reconsider policies and make changes. In addition, this process affects the gentrification process in the city as the gentrification often are slower than planned due to the unforeseen social mobilization and social resistance.

Figure 5: The linkage between the chosen theories in the Rio de Janeiro context




Figure 5: Gentrification can trigger social mobilization that can result in changing citizenship

4. Methodology

When carrying out a research project, it is important to choose a design and methods to use depending on what the focus of the research is and what you want to find out. There are two main methodological approaches, quantitative and qualitative. In this thesis I have used qualitative study, that aims at creating a deeper understanding of a given context or a phenomenon (Thagaard, 2013, p. 17). In qualitative research, it is important to understand the participants' understanding of a phenomenon (Silverman, 2014, p. 44), and analysing the relationship between the theory and collected data (Bryman, 2012, p. 380).

4.1. Research Design and Methods

Case study in qualitative research does not refer to research of individual persons, but analytical generalisations about social processes (Silverman, 2014, p. 69). Case study analyses a community, or an event, in order to seek a better understanding of the complexity of the case (Bryman, 2012, pp. 66-67). I chose a case study design for my research to be able to get a better understanding of the context of the struggles at Metrô Mangueira. I chose theoretical sampling were I decided to study the former residents of Metrô Mangueira due to their relevance to my research questions. Theoretical sampling aims at constructing a sample that are explanatory and theoretically meaningful (Silverman, 2014, p. 62).

The main methods I have used for collecting data have been analysing texts and documents, observations and interviews (Bryman, 2012, p. 383; Silverman, 2014, pp. 42-43). This is what Silverman (2014, pp. 45-47) calls mixed methods. The methods used for collecting empirical data include unstructured and semi-structured interviews, focus group and participation observation. In addition to analysis of secondary resources such as texts and documents. Silverman (2014, pp. 42-43) also mentions audio recording as an important and effective method of data collection, which I have used in combination with interviews.

I have focused on how Rio de Janeiro have used Mega-Sports Events (MSE) to implement gentrification in urban planning and in what ways social mobilization changed the form of citizenship for the residents of Metrô Mangueira. Theories of gentrification, social mobilization and citizenship has therefore been the theoretical position of this research. The experiences the former residents of Metrô Mangueira expressed through interviews and observations have further been analysed together with secondary texts and documents. Instead of focusing on a

large sample size, I have had a smaller sample size and focused the research on creating a better understanding of the interviewees' experiences through unstructured and semi-structured interviews (Silverman, 2014, p. 44).

4.1.1. Interviews

Throughout my fieldwork, I conducted three types of interviews; unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews and one focus group interview. From these interviews, I got valid information about how the situation was during the struggles of removals and what was important for the community to manage to change the authorities' plans. In interviews with open-ended questions the interviewee(s) can talk freely about what he/she think is important. Flexible questions are more likely to give the researcher access to the informants experiences that can provide the research with a depth and complexity other methods cannot (Silverman, 2014, p. 171). The data collected from the interviews gave me access to the former residents of Metrô Mangueira experiences of the process around the evictions and the struggles for better offers of housing closer to Mangueira. In addition I was brought to a rather unexpected finding about their current living situation. In chapter 7.2 I analyse what the new living situation has done to their quality of life, but it is a something that could be researched more in depth in future research.

The thesis is created on analysis of text and documents and the experiences and perceptions of the people forcefully evicted from Metrô Mangueira in the period of 2010-2013, according to data collected from semi-structured interviews conducted with six families, one association and two researchers, in addition to, one focus group and many unstructured interviews. Due to the limited time I had in the field, interviews were an effective collection of qualitative data. The two main types of interviews in quantitative research is unstructured- and semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 2012, p. 469), which was the ones most used in my fieldwork.

The interviews I conducted in the field had enough flexibility that it was possible to change the order, form of the questions, and ask additional questions according to the information that came out of the interviews. Qualitative interviews are more flexible due to the interest in the interviewees point of view, this is more plausible in a flexible structure where the interviewees have room to talk about what they see as relevant and important (Bryman, 2012, p. 470). The interview guide formulated in advanced, worked as guidelines throughout the interviews, with

general questions that were flexible and changeable in order and form, according to who were being interviewed (Bryman, 2012, pp. 212-213).

All the interviews I conducted with former residents of Metrô Mangueira was with families where both husband and the wife were present. The level of participation by sexes varied, whereas the women was mostly active in all interviews I conducted. The men constantly questioned why I was there and what difference it would make for them to talk to me, with exception of one family where only the husband spoke. The selection of informants have been done as follows: I have chosen to have the family in focus of the research of one simple, but important reason. Most households consist of the nuclear family with or without the extended family. Families tend to make decisions based on beliefs of what is best for their children and family as a whole. In addition, when talking to families, the experiences of women and men can diverge due to different positions and responsibilities in the home and the community.

During my fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro, I interviewed one researcher familiar with the situation and the removal process in Metrô Mangueira. In addition, I managed to interview the residents association of Mangueira, and Christopher Gaffney, a researcher on the field of MSEs and its effects on local community in host cities. I also had a meeting with the Norwegian Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, which had some insight on how the processes of removal normally occur in Rio de Janeiro.

I conducted one focus group where five women participated. The women that participated in the focus group were all active in the demonstrations before the removals, and some of them were lobbying for the committee of Metrô Mangueira, for better offers from the government during the struggles. The aim of doing a focus group was to see if people agreed about how the process of the removals had happened. According to Bryman (2012, p. 501) focus groups are an interesting way to look at the interaction that takes place within a group and how they discuss the events. Bryman (2012, p. 502) mentions two methods of focus groups: A group interview is where several topics are discussed, whereas focused interview is where a group of people are chosen specially because they have special involvement in a theme. The focus group I had was a group interview where we discussed how the removals affected them and how they fought for better offers of substitute homes and the challenges they face in their new life environment. I did not know that these women had been active in the mobilization before the interviews started.

During my stay in Rio de Janeiro, I had several unstructured interviews with several persons inside the complex of Manguera and in the city centre of Rio de Janeiro about how the MSEs have affected urban poor, and especially Manguera, and the people living at Metrô Manguera.

4.1.2. Observations

Even though ethnography or observations are not seen to be as effective in data collection as interviews and focus groups, it is important to get a better understanding of the culture of a social group (Bryman, 2012, p. 383). Observations are appropriate for a preliminary stage of the research, used as a method to seek a better understanding of another culture or situation (Silverman, 2014, pp. 43-44). For my fieldwork, observations were important to gain better knowledge of the security issue in Manguera. My informants were afraid of saying too much because of the criminal gangs in the neighbourhood, and it was a tense atmosphere when I was present in Manguera I and II. In addition I got to see armed children as guards for the criminal gangs, and how they communicated so that the leaders at all times would know what was going on. The intense presence of criminality was constant and the consequences of doing something wrong, in the eyes of the criminals, can cost you your life.

One of my informants got clearance from the criminal leader to take me inside the complex of Manguera. This was agreed upon the day before so that all the criminal guards were aware of my arrival. I met with my informant at the Maracanã metro station, then we entered the complex of Manguera. At each corner there was a criminal guard signalling, through a walkie-talkie, that we were coming. During the walk through the complex of Manguera, up to the top of the hill I had several smaller unstructured interviews with residents and criminals of Manguera. They all had interesting thoughts on how the MSEs had effected Manguera and what was needed for the situation to change for the better in the future.

On my stroll through the complex of Manguera, I was told about the brutal ways the criminal gangs punish people that '*do them wrong*' and the sites of execution. I do understand that the fear for the criminal gangs are real, as human life seems to be worthless and even a misunderstanding can cost a human life. It is crucial for people living in these circumstances to take precautions, fair or not. I wrote detailed field notes and reflections every day during my stay in Rio de Janeiro. Field notes are important to the research because of the weaknesses of the human mind, the field notes can provide the right information about an event or something

said or done (Bryman, 2012, p. 447). See attachment 4, for the notes from one of my experiences from the field.

4.2.Challenges and Limitations

Gaining access to a closed setting can be challenging and might not go as planned. Gaining access involves a combination of hard work, strategic planning and luck (Bryman, 2012, p. 435). Mangueira I and II are physically closed from the public by tall walls surrounding the buildings. Many researchers and journalists have been interested in talking to the residents about their struggles at Metrô Mangueira, and they are tired of people studying them and not getting anything in return, and their situation remaining the same. Security is also an issue and the tense atmosphere in the two condominiums reflects this issue. According to Bryman (2012, p. 435) a good strategy of gaining access to closed settings is using all contacts you come over, like friends, colleagues, academics or others that can help you get in contact with people inside the community.

Before I left for the field I started to make contacts through friends, and I managed to get access to Mangueira II my second day in Rio de Janeiro. The tense atmosphere gave me an indicator that it would be difficult to gain more access to the community. As Bryman (2012, p. 439) express, gaining access does not mean you have on-going access. People have to talk to you, but many you meet in a closed setting will be suspicious of your intentions, or afraid the interpretation may be wrong and cause them harm afterwards. Therefore, it is important to be clear about your intentions and be prepared for unexpected changes (Bryman, 2012, pp. 435, 439). Some contacts I got through interviewees, this is called snowball sample, where social network of informants is used to get new informants or gain more access (Silverman, 2014, p. 61). It took me over one week to be able to visit the condominiums again.

In the meantime, I managed to make contact with academics and through friends of friends of friends and so on, I was able to establish more contacts in Mangueira. What Bryman (2012, p. 435) calls key informants is getting support from someone within that can give you clearance in the field. In my case, I had to have someone respected in the favela allowing me to gain access. Two persons became the key informants in my fieldwork directing me to the right places, people and situations (Bryman, 2012, pp. 439-440). For me to be able to gain access to the condominiums again, I had to pay a fee to one person in the community to take me in and

organize the meetings with the families in Mangueira I and II. Several of the academics I talked to about paying a fee, all agreed that this was reasonable and possibly the only entrance possibility I would have in such short time.

During my fieldwork, I experienced difficulties entering the area of study. People that do not live in Mangueira do not have access to the narrow alleys of the favela. Armed criminals guard the entrances, and your only entrance as an outsider is with a respected favela dweller. Due to the location of Mangueira I and II, the criminals have direct access to the condominiums through a hole in the back of the wall in Mangueira I. This makes the families vulnerable, because of the violent encounters between the criminals and the police. In addition, the criminal gang has taken the lead of the area, and claims taxes and control. It is important for the reader to understand that I did not have access to Mangueira I and II or the complex of Mangueira without locals taking me in as their visitor. I could not just show up and walk around.

There are criminal armed guards at every entrance of the favela, and they communicate through walky-talkies. One of my informants is well respected in Mangueira and could take me in to the complex of Mangueira. The informant showed me the top of the favela with its stunning view of the city. At the top, you can see the sea, the Maracanã stadium and the whole favela in all directions. The favela has varying standards of living, the houses at the top have higher standards, while the ones at the bottom have low standards, and some are even made of tin. The favela consists of staircases and tiny roads, and at each corner, armed guards signaling through walkie-talkies so that the criminal leader would know our exact location at all times.

When I entered Mangueira I and II, I always had an appointment with a family that met me by the entrance gate. For me to move around the area, these had to accompany me. I did not get permission to take photos, except of the buildings in Mangueira II, without any people appearing in the photo. People were afraid of talking freely, and I experienced differentiated answers according to whom I was with when I talked to them. One of the biggest limitations in this thesis is that the answers I got differ from whom I was with during the interviews and if we were in Mangueira or met outside the community. Almost all the families I talked to, I met inside of Mangueira I or II. It would be interesting to see if the answers would be different if we had met another place, for example in the centre of Rio de Janeiro.

The limitations of the focus group were many; firstly, we sat outside so that the noise of the streets makes the recording poor. In addition, when the women got excited or the discussion was intense they tended to talk all at the same time, which made it difficult for me as the researcher to steer the discussion and transcribe the interview afterwards. Another limitation of the focus group is that in a group, the individual might not be prone to express themselves in the same way as for individual interviews (Bryman, 2012, pp. 517-518).

I was to interview the Secretary Governor of the Department of Habitat of Rio de Janeiro and the special military police force, UPP, which was present in Mangueira in the period of 2011-2016. Due to an unexpected situation back in Norway I had to cut the fieldwork short and come back home. Unfortunately, this resulted in cancelled interviews with the Secretary Governor of the Department of Habitat in Rio de Janeiro, and the leader of the UPP team in Mangueira. Three times, I marked Skype interviews with the secretary governor of the department of habitat, but each time it was rescheduled. At the end, the interview did not take place.

One of the biggest limitations of this thesis is the time limitation of the fieldwork. Altogether, I stayed in Rio de Janeiro for 3 weeks, living in an area called Meier, about seven km from Mangueira. I stayed with a local, working-class woman in a quiet neighbourhood. Due to safety reasons, I decided not to stay in Mangueira, but visit almost on a daily basis to seek a better understanding of their life situation and their views of the MSEs and its effects on their daily lives. By including a large spectre of stakeholders in the research, I intended to get a more complete understanding of the situation. Due to time limitations in the research most of my informants are citizens from Metrô Mangueira, thus this study has focused on their experiences of the phenomenon.

There are several components influencing this kind of research, such as sex, age, ethnicity, language, etc. Several of the academics I meet in Brazil thought my results would be interesting since I went to Mangueira as a young, foreign female researcher. They were certain I would get other answers to my questions than they would. Due to time limitations and a question of security, I did not look at the situation for the ones moved to Cosmos or Triagem, but it would be interesting to see how their situation differ from the people living in Mangueira I and II. The fact that I speak the language was a huge advantage during my fieldwork. The people I talked to seemed more relaxed when they realised I speak Portuguese fluently, and I did not use any

translator during my stay in Rio de Janeiro, which also ensured that I did not lose data and details from the interview material, which can be a problem when using a translator.

4.2.1. Quality

The quality of the data could have been stronger if the fieldwork had been longer, but due to the circumstances, this was not possible. *“As elsewhere, in Brazil there are many truths and whatever truth someone tells you is their truth, so who knows what actually happened ... there are so many different perspectives”* (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017). The security situation in Manguera can have affected the answers I got from the interviews, as some of the interviewees kept looking to the doors and windows to make sure no one were listening. The interviewees might not have felt they could talk freely in the setting within their community. When one of my key informants presented me to a new family to interview, I could sense that some of the interviewees were not comfortable talking freely in front of my key informant. I also experienced that the key informant interfered in the interview when disagreeing with the interviewee, and I had to ask the key informant to let the interviewee talk.

Reliability refers to the consistence of information through the various informants (Silverman, 2014, p. 83). External validity is if the findings are applicable to other cases. Case studies can be generalizable to theoretical propositions, but normally not to populations. Meaning that the validity of the study is most likely not applicable to other cases but can be analytical generalizable (Silverman, 2014, p. 63). The purpose of the research was not just to get a better understanding of the residents' experiences from the struggles at Metrô Manguera, but to generate knowledge and interpretations that can be recognizable or even applicable for other social mobilizations. An example is how the women former active in the committee of Metrô Manguera expressed the importance of the horizontal linkages with other communities, and how this weakened what they called “the state terror” of house demolition. As well as, how they all agreed that the networks they managed to create with the international media and the public defenders were vital for the mobilization to put pressure on the authorities. The vertical and horizontal linkages created in the social mobilization are presumably transferable knowledge (Johannessen, Tufte, & Kristoffersen, 2009, p. 200).

4.3.Ethics

All of the informants from Mangureira are anonymous for the sake of their privacy and security. I talked to several researchers during the work with the thesis, and conducted interviews with two of them. I got approval in advance to refer to Mr. Gaffney and Mr. Faulhaber in my thesis. This was approved before I started writing the findings, and I have also done a reference check during the writing process of this thesis. The reason I have chosen to quote them is that I have also used their published work for the creation of this thesis, and with their knowledge and understanding of the situation of Metrô Mangureira, their insight might enlighten some issues.

When I sat down with the interviewees, I explained who I am and why I was there (the introduction to interviews is attached, but is in Portuguese). The interviewees got a confirmation from my university and the introduction letter with my contact information before the interview started. I asked if it was ok that I recorded our conversation and ensured them that it was only for the use of my thesis and that material would be deleted after the end of the study period. There is a risk of people not wanting to talk freely when they are recorded (Bryman, 2012, p. 483), but I did not feel this was an issue in Mangureira I and II. The informants were ok with me recording the interviews as long as their names were not mentioned in the record, or their picture not taken. I made sure none of the informants expected gifts or money in return, but that I could offer to send them a Portuguese summary of the thesis after submitting it (Everett & Furseth, 2012, pp. 140-141). Most of the interviews conducted was between 45 and 75 minutes. Only one of the interviews was shorter, lasting fifteen minutes.

To offer something in return (Bryman, 2012, p. 435) for the trouble and for people using their time to talk to me was essential for my fieldwork. I informed all the participants before the interviews stated that the research was for my master thesis, and that it probably will not have direct effects on their daily situation, but that I appreciate their time talking to me and helping understand their situation. I offered all I talked to, to send them a summary of the thesis in Portuguese, and the English written thesis if they were interested, and all seem to think that was a good idea. This way they can see the result of our meetings.

5. Case Study: Metrô Mangureira

Metrô Mangureira was a small favela with approximately 700 families living there before the evictions started in 2010. By the end of 2012, 684 families was removed to either Cosmos,

Santa Cruz, Triagem, Mangureira I or Mangureira II. What happened with the remaining 16 families, I do not know. In this chapter, I will present the informants experiences and perspectives of the Mega-Sports Events (MSE) effects on the evictions from Metrô Mangureira, how they could participate before, during and after the evictions and how they managed to influence the authorities' plans of resettlement. In addition, we will look at some of the positive and negative effects of living in the Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV) complexes of Mangureira I and II.

5.1.Metrô Mangureira and the World Cup

When it was known that Brazil would host the World Cup in 2014, the urban development of Rio de Janeiro happen rapidly, and it is very likely the cause if the evictions at Metrô Mangureira. There was not that varied answers when I asked why they thought they were evicted from Metrô Mangureira. The majority said it was because of the World Cup in 2014, that the government wanted to make a parking lot for visitors to the Maracanã stadium. About half of these told me that the plans later changed for making an automobile store that stands there unfinished today. One of the families did not know why, and one family said the governments had made them sign a document saying that their house was an environmental risk.

According to Faulhaber (personal interview, 02.02.2017), the plans of using Metrô Mangureira for a parking, and then the automobile store was just excuses. The real aim of the removals was to eliminate the visibility of the favela for the visitors of Maracanã football stadium, since it disrupted the urban layout of *Maracanã and around*. Gaffney (personal interview, 17.03.2017) express that there was limited or no environmental reason to remove Metrô Mangureira, that it was a favela like any other. The location of the community was in a nice spot that captured the car traffic of the Maracanã stadium, and therefore was highly visible for the visitors for the stadium. This can indicate that the space of Metrô Mangureira was not the important factor for the removals, but rather a social cleansing process for the international eye.

Some of the informants thought they would be exposed for eviction at some time, even though there had not been any MSEs. Metrô Mangureira had been threatened with evictions by the government before, but the government had never gone through with it before. They said the government used the MSEs as excuses to erase the favela from Rio de Janeiro's new gentrified, modern landscape.

5.2. The process of the evictions and how the citizens participated

In the middle of 2010, government workers came to Metrô Mangueira, and did not disclose their intentions. Several people I talked to remember that the government people said they were doing research. Later, the Municipal workers came to Metrô Mangueira and told the residents they had to move to Cosmos. The residents did not want to leave and started protesting. The military police was sent into the favela to silence the citizens' with violence. No platform of participation was offered the citizens of Metrô Mangueira in the planning process of the area, and they got just a few days' notice of eviction.

That was when the women in the neighbourhood started a community committee. The local priest from the '*pastoral das favelas*', a catholic network, advised them to contact the public defenders for help. The Public defenders is a part of the official judicial system and offers free legal aid to who cannot afford legal help otherwise. Just a stone's throw away is the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), which has been present in many of Rio de Janeiro's favelas to help the favela dwellers in their struggles. Professors and students from UERJ were aware of the situation in Metrô Mangueira, and offered to help. A foreign researcher was working at the UERJ at this time, and with his international connections, they managed to call the international medias' attention to Metrô Mangueira. The media brought the violations of human rights the citizens experienced by the military police to the international agenda, which put pressure on the Brazilian government.

5.3. Victory for Metrô Mangueira?

Some of the residents had heard about the planning of Mangueira I and went to the Municipal office and asked about the apartments, but were rejected because the project was Caixa's. I was told that the projects were for people that signed up at Caixa to buy an apartment. People that cannot afford to buy at the normal real estate market can apply to buy through MCMV at Caixa. Here they have to pay a small fee every month for ten years before the apartments are legally theirs. Caixa has a lottery system where they randomly pick out a name of whom applied to get an apartment.

The first struggle passed when the mayor, of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo da Costa Paes (January 2009 – January 2017), and the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral Filho

(January 2007 – April 2014), came to the favela, and suggested they would be resettled to Mangureira I. In the meantime, some families had moved to Cosmos, and their houses at Metrô Mangureira were demolished. Many of the residents did not know that they would gain apartments at Mangureira I before the municipal workers came that same night to move people's belongings to the new apartments in Mangureira I.

The move to Mangureira I was brutal, as several people told me. One day some municipal workers came to Metrô Mangureira and told the families that it would happen that same moment. One of the families told me that the woman was pregnant and home alone while the other family members were working. She had to throw their stuff into the van, and go with the municipal workers to the new apartment where they threw their belonging in front of the apartment. Then she had to carry all their things into the new apartment by herself. Luckily, their new apartment was at the ground floor. Another family had to move their things by themselves later that same day because the husband refused to let the municipal workers throw their things in the van; they managed help with friends to take their things to the new apartment 350 m from Metrô Mangureira the same night.

Some residents claims on the other hand that when Mangureira I was ready in 2011, workers from the local government showed up in Metrô Mangureira with a notice to the first families, two days in advance. Two days later the government workers showed up with big trucks ready to move the residents belongings. Other families claims they did not receive any warnings in advance, and were told they had to pack their things in 2 hours if they would like help to move. Many did not have other options and let the government workers throw their things into the trucks, in some trucks the things of several families where transported at the same time, mixing their belongings. When they arrived at Mangureira I they were given the keys to the apartments and their things where left on the sidewalk for them to separate and take into their new homes. Authorities' attitudes towards certain communities are often reflected in the attention towards their needs (Evans, 1996, p. 1126). As the former residents of Metrô Mangureira recall the situation, they express feeling unfairly treated by the authorities. Government workers often disrespect land-less people, the eviction practices are illegal and there are individualized negotiations with the residents of a neighbourhood receiving offers from MCMV (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 76).

After the first residents moved to Mangueira I, the struggles and demonstrations started once more at Metrô Mangueira. Housing in Cosmos was again offered to the remaining families. A new round of active struggles, UERJ was with them in the favela through the struggles, and the international media came again documenting the violence exercised by the police. The community committee worked with other favelas in similar positions to guard houses when no one was home to prevent the government from demolishing houses without them knowing it. The public defenders were actively working to make sure the citizens were not moved more than 7 km away according to the Municipal Law.

The mayor, Eduardo Paes and the governor, Sergio Cebal came to the favela again and calmed the situation by giving the rest of the residents promises for substitute homes in Mangueira II and Triagem in 2012. This time the residents were informed some months in advance, and they had the chance to arrange the move. Because of the pressure the residents of Metrô Mangueira managed to put on the governments with their mobilization, the government was able to change the plans for the projected social housing; Mangueira I and II, for the residents of Metrô Mangueira and a few others from the complex of Mangueira.

In September 2013 the plans for the parking lot were changed. The local government decided to create an automotive store (Junior et al., 2015, p. 237). Today you can see the half-finished building of the automotive store, abandoned. After the evictions of all the residents from Metrô Mangueira, the local government did not demolish all the houses, and new occupants appeared. These are homeless people occupying the houses even without doors and windows (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 101). There have been several rounds of evictions from Metrô Mangueira after this where the new occupants did not get any offers since they are not originally from the area.

5.4. The time after the removals

Large gates and tall brick walls circle both Mangueira I and II, and gatekeepers guard the entrances. The appearance of the MCMV housing stands out compared to the rest of the favela, which, according to Arrigoitia (2017, p. 83) creates a new separation from the outside world. As demonstrated in figure 6, the appearance of the blocks of MCMV stands out from the favela houses in the background. The rest of the complex of Mangueira has small, tall houses, both in bad and good conditions. The houses are close to each other with only tiny roads or stairways.

The area surrounding Manguera I and II is also called “*Morro de Manguera*” because it is built on a hill, as many of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.

Figure 6: Manguera I and II



Figure 6: Photo of Manguera I and II. Private photo taken from across the railway and road, from the UERJ building 17.02.2017

There is almost no mix of families with different levels of income in the MCMV projects. The concentration of low-income families makes it hard to change the culture of living as urban poor (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 77). 72 percent of the residents in Manguera I and II are originally from Metrô Manguera, 14 percent from the Complex of Manguera and the remaining 14 percent from other places in Rio de Janeiro. All of the residents have been evicted by the municipality because their previous houses were in environmental risk-areas, or due to urban development plans (Junior et al., 2015, p. 244).

Manguera I and II is located at the bottom of the favela, by one of the many entrances to the narrow alleys of the favela and by the passage bridge linking Manguera to the metro station and the other side of the railway. In figure 7, you see the entrance to complex of Manguera on the right, in the middle the passage bridge connecting Manguera to the metro station of Maracanã and the other side of the passage bridge, and to the left in the picture, you see the first

buildings of Mangueira II. Passing Mangueira II you come to Mangueira I, though not visible in this photo.

Figure 7: Street view of road 144 R. Visc. de Niterói, Rio de Janeiro



Figure 7: To the right is the entrance to the Complex of Mangueira, in the middle the passage bridge to the metro station of Maracanã and to the left Mangueira II. Retrieved from (Street view of road 144 R. Visc. de Niterói, Rio de Janeiro. Image. GoogleMaps, 2017b)

The people I talked to all agreed that the access to work, schools and health institutions were the same in Mangueira I and II as at Metrô Mangueira. Many of MCMV projects are located in areas with bad transport systems, and poor access to work, education and health institutions, which has direct impact on livelihoods and create a concentration of poverty in these areas (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 77). In Mangueira I and II this is not an issue, in fact the access to public transportation and the city centre of Rio de Janeiro had actually improved with the new passage bridge in front of Mangueira I and II. Junior et al. (2015, p. 245) confirms that the access has improved for the residents of Mangueira in general.

At Metrô Mangueira they did not have any residential address and could not receive post, therefore they had to get their mail sent to the post office. They could not have installed electricity or other equipment to pay for since they did not have any documentation of residence or postal address. Having a postal address and receiving bills is a part of the inclusive citizenship. Several of my informants told me that by having a postal address and being able to

receive visit without feeling embarrassed about their home had improved their life quality. They could proudly show off their apartments without feeling that the other felt sorry for them.

Almost all agree that the standard of the apartments in MCMV are better than the houses at Metrô Mangueira, but that they miss the liberty of having a backyard, where they could have friends over for barbeque and fill up pools for the children to play. The families in Mangueira I and II refer to Metrô Mangueira as a favela and their new apartments as a part of the community of Mangueira. The status of living in a condominium, with gatekeepers was apparent, even though they were not satisfied with everything; overall they seemed to be pleased. The stigma of living in a favela was gone, and they could proudly say they lived in Mangueira I or II.

5.4.1. Negative Effects

All the apartments in Mangueira I and II are alike, 40 km², with two bedrooms, one bathroom and a living room with an open kitchen. Several families stated that the apartments are too small for their families. Almost all the families came from bigger houses at Metrô Mangueira. Generation houses are normal in Brazil, where several generations live in one house with separate parts of the house. For example, there was one family living in a three-floor house, where each floor had separate kitchen, bathroom, living room and one-to-three bedrooms. A family consisting of grandmother, grandfather, one daughter with her husband and two children and one son with his wife and three children got one apartment because the government saw the house as one unit. While another family, consisting of one couple got the same size apartment. This shows that the families did not have any possibility to contribute to the planning process of Mangueira I and II. They did not receive what their family needed, even though they managed to get a better offer in term of location, than the first offer of housing in Cosmos.

The favela dwellers of Metrô Mangueira were not informed about the costs of living in condominiums constructed by MCMV. They only received information that they would not pay for the apartment since the favela was classified as low-income households and they had to be resettled. Many say that the living costs came as a shock. Not all residents agree about the necessities of the costs, but here I find a big difference. All of my informants agree that the expenditure of their new life in the condominium is higher than what they had expected. In their old neighbourhoods, they did not pay for water and lights, as they had illegally tapped electricity

and water, without paying. Now they have to pay for water, light, condominium, and garbage collection. For the poorest residents it is not possible to pay for the expenditure, and they suffer from closed water and no electricity in their apartments. Others argue that some people do not see the importance of paying these taxes and do not pay even though they can. This causes an extra financial burden for others who have to pay extra to maintain the area and keep the gatekeepers. The individualism of paying taxes for own consumption combined with the high prices is a sharp contrast to community life where people share and help their neighbours (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 84).

The residents organize to keep their new site of residential as good and clean as possible, but there are differences in the organisation of Mangueira I and Mangueira II. It seems like the organisation in Mangueira II is working better than in Mangueira I. In Mangueira I the criminals have direct access through a hole in the back of the brick wall, which make the residents more vulnerable than in Mangueira II. The lack of payments in Mangueira I, makes the others pay the unpaid bill, and when they cannot pay the water is cut for all the residents in the condominium. In Mangueira II they contracted a firm to install meters to measure how much water each apartment consumes, and thereby each apartment pay for their own consumption.

About half of my informants talked about loss of freedom. Some of the informants think they are being cheated, that there are people behind the taxes, making money on their behalf. The other part of my informants also think the costs are high, but that they are necessary for the condominium to work. They would rather pay the fees and be proud of where they live than going back to Metrô Mangueira where the sanitation was bad and the neighbourhood vulnerable. As we have seen, many do not understand why they have to pay taxes, and think they are being set up or tricked (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 85). Peoples mentality and memories can disrupt the MCMVs aim of relocating people to new sites of residence to improve their possibilities in society (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 72). One of MCMVs goals is to integrate residents into formal economy, including consumption and paying for the costs of it (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 85). How is it possible for people not used to pay for their consumptions to understand the costs if they do not have the information or the economic ability?

In Mangueira I and II, I did not get the impression of clientelism, as Nuijten (2013) explains from her fieldwork in Recife, in northern Brazil. The women in the community talked about their rights and how they were informed about the rights of housing and the help they had to

claim their rights from the public defenders. On the other hand, none of my informants mentioned anything about their duties to the state, rather it seems like some of the former residents of Metrô Mangueira expected the state to pay for them. There are conflicting understanding of rights and duties with citizenship, as some of the families interviewed did not understand why they had to pay bills when they did not do it at Metrô Mangueira. They thought they were being cheated. While some of the other women thought it was important to pay for their own use, even though the expenditure was higher than at Metrô Mangueira, they felt good about it, feeling they were good citizens.

In Mangueira I, common areas are poorly maintained, while in Mangueira II the grass is green and there are flowers in the garden. Some of the women said that from the beginning, Mangueira II have had good organisation, and all residents have been invited to meetings and participated in decisions that are made for the condominium. Mangueira II has a strong female-led organization originated from the committee of Metrô Mangueira. In both condominiums the playing areas were broken, staircases and walls were damaged. MCMV uses for-profit private developers when constructing the projects, which often results in expensive maintenance services not affordable for the new residents (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 76).

I asked all I interviewed if they felt Mangueira I and II was included in the rest of the society of Mangueira. The interviewees said that they feel they are included when it comes to payments and power, but not the privileges. It is clear that the criminals have power in Mangueira I and II as well as the rest of Mangueira, and people are afraid of doing and saying things the criminals might not like. Several people said that a new person comes and claims taxes each time. The papers they bring do not have any names, just the number of the apartment and the block. They do not know for what or to whom the money goes, but no one dares to resist paying.

The downside of living so close to the Complex of Mangueira is that many people from the favela think that since they lived in condominiums they automatically had more money. This causes a distance between the residents of Mangueira I and II and the rest of the. The residents do not feel they are included in all aspects of the local society in Mangueira. After the Olympic Games ended in 2016, the UPP withdrew their presence in many favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and Mangueira was one of them. During my fieldwork, armed criminal guards were again visible throughout the complex of Mangueira. This is a throwback for the sense of security in

Mangueira as well as for other favelas in Rio de Janeiro. However, inside the condominiums of Mangueira I and II, there were no visible arms.

Many favela dwellers do not have any legal papers of residence, and live in constant fear of eviction (Davis, 2007, p. 102). One of the main aims of MCMV is to give favela dwellers access to property owner possibilities. While only one of the families I talked to had papers showing that the apartment was theirs, none of the other families had received any legal documentation of the apartments and several said they are still afraid that the government coming back to evict them again. Their livelihoods are therefore unstable and they live in constant fear of eviction. Some of the residents have contracts receiving the keys to the apartments, but only one of my informants could show me the contract, and several said they had never seen any contracts. None of the residents of Mangueira I or II thought they would receive the contracts after ten years of residents without fighting for it. They did not think that the government nor the Caixa would take the time to make the contracts if they did not demand it.

5.4.2. Security

The energy in the two condominiums was tense when I was there, especially in Mangueira I, where I was not allowed to take any photos, and no one came and talked with me when I was doing the interviews, except the interviewees. The last day I visited Mangueira II, I was allowed to take photos of the blocks, but not the people. Clearly, they were afraid of who were watching and that I could document whom I had talked with. I could record the interviews, but they would not tell me their names. The security issue of Mangueira was probably not taken into consideration when the government and Caixa projected the MCMV in Mangueira. Usually security are not seen as an issue in social housing and upgrading programs in Brazil, because of the criminalization of favela dwellers (Nuijten, 2013, p. 18). Security should be considered, as the programs aim at giving the families access to risk-free homes.

It is common that the power or leadership in the MCMV projects are taken over by the criminal gangs or *militia* – an informal mafia, who violently takes control over territories with weak leadership, and require taxes or forcibly evict (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 79) and sell the apartments for their own profit. Since Mangueira I and II is located at the roots of the complex of Mangueira, it seems that there are no militia in these condominiums, but the criminal gang of Mangueira is present. It was obvious that people were afraid by the way my informants looked

to the windows and doors while I was interviewing them, talking quietly when referring to taxes they did not know what was for, but they could not ask due to possible repercussions.

There are different people claiming taxes each time in the condominiums, and the residents do not know exactly who is responsible. But they are afraid of asking because they know that it is likely to be the criminal gang of Mangureira. For example, all apartments have one parking space inside the condominium, but few families have cars. The parking was full the first day I was there, and I was told that the residents do not know whose cars were parked there. People pay to park their car in the condominium, the residents do not know to whom. The meaning of having the gatekeeper is to feel safe inside the condominium, but several agreed that this is not possible, when outsiders are let in every day to use the parking. In Mangureira I, I was told they were afraid neighbours or other people inside the condominiums would do something to them during the night if they walked outside the apartments. However, this does not seem to be a problem in Mangureira II. It is obvious that people in Mangureira I feel more vulnerable than in Mangureira II. Some people are renting out their apartments in Mangureira I to afford renting an apartment elsewhere.

Both condominiums have chosen a manager (*síndico*⁴) to take charge in the condominium and make sure things are fixed. The residents told me that the *síndico* is a condominium manager that is elected by the residents at annual meetings in the condominium. The responsibility of the manager is to contract firms when they need work done in the condominium and to get the best quality and prices. The managers of the two condominiums told me that Caixa are going to give the documents of residency to the residents when 10 years have passed. Normally when low-income people buy apartments through Caixa and MCMV, they pay a symbolic sum monthly for 10 years before the apartments are fully theirs, and even though the former residents of Metrô Mangureira are not paying for the apartments, the managers tell me that the same system applies for them. The managers also state that all residents have received a document confirming that they received the key, which is valid until the apartments are put in their names after 10 years.

When I later asked residents if they have documentations on the apartments, they all told me no, but when I asked if they received a contract with the key, a few said yes, but that it does not

⁴ Translation from (Dictionary, 2017).

count for anything. It is difficult to say with certainty without talking to Caixa and the Department of Habitat in Rio de Janeiro, if the documents are valid or not. There are contradictory knowledge about the condominium manager, who and what the purpose of the person is. Some people think the manger is responsible for everything that happens inside the condominium, the payments as well. While others looks at the manager as the leader of the organization of the condominium, but that what is done is collective, the ones that shows up at meetings and volunteer to maintain the area.

6. Analysis

Rio de Janeiro's political object of hosting the World Cup 2014 and the Summer Olympics 2016, was first and foremost to be acknowledged as a "global city" (Gaffney, 2013, p. 13). In the bidding of the World Cup and the Olympics, the Brazilian government promised upgrading and new infrastructure in hosting cities. For Rio de Janeiro, this meant massive changes in infrastructure, cuts in social budgets and large amount of public money spent on sportive arenas and urban infrastructures around these. As we have seen through this thesis, the many decisions made around these developments have disrupted urban life in many ways.

In this chapter, I am going to apply the selected theory to the case of Rio de Janeiro and Metrô Mangueira, to explain the processes visible in Rio de Janeiro as a result of hosting the World Cup and the Summer Olympics. The period in focus is from 2009, when it was announced that Rio de Janeiro was to host the Summer Olympics, until February 2017, six months after the Olympic Games finished. To understand how Mega-Sports Events (MSE) has been used in urban policy and how they have enabled gentrification in Rio de Janeiro, and the changes it has caused in urban development. Further, I will elaborate how these urban processes have triggered social mobilizations and changed forms of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro. With the case of Metrô Mangueira, I will show how the selected theories are relevant for understanding how the processes can have been initiated because of MSEs, and triggered many social mobilizations in Rio de Janeiro in the last decade. To understand the potential of urban dwellers in the making of the city, I have looked at Metrô Mangueira as my case, and how the favela dwellers was able to change the plans the government had for them, by using their citizenship actively.

6.1. Gentrification in the Urban Planning of Rio de Janeiro

Urban planning in Rio de Janeiro has, since the 1990's, been affected by neoliberal urbanism that used gentrification to increase real-estate prices, and has become a driver for the new urban economic expansion in many cities (Smith, 2002, pp. 446-447). Gentrification is often included in the process of becoming a "global city", which is dominated by capital flows (Hamnett, 1991, p. 174). Changes due to gentrification can be seen as neo-colonialism. To create global capital flows, social cleansing of public space is seen as necessary for opening up urban space for global visitors and to extract capital from poorer areas (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1135).

Even though gentrification theory has been mostly used in European and North American settings, does not mean it is not relevant for other parts of the world. Especially after the third wave of gentrification with increased state involvement in the process, that is highly applicable for the urbanization process in Latin America, and more precisely for Rio de Janeiro as an emerging "global city". Gentrification occurs different in various places, and can even vary within one city, it is therefore important to study the gentrification process locally (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1134).

As might be the emerging fourth wave of gentrification, the 'generalization of gentrification' is evident in Rio de Janeiro where gentrification has been implemented in urban policy by using MSEs as excuses to gentrify larger parts of the city rapidly. In Rio de Janeiro the gentrification process has been state-led, to offer the elite, the foreign market and the middle-class new hip and secure residential areas and places of leisure in addition to upgraded and new sportive arenas and infrastructure surrounding these. Using MSEs as one of the major strategies in becoming a "global city", gentrifying several areas to match the standards of IOC, has been Rio de Janeiro's attempt of global recognition.

To create a national urge to host the World Cup, ex-President Lula played on the formal citizenship and a common sense of football identity of the Brazilian people. In Norway, there is a saying that Norwegians are born with skis on their feet. In Brazil, the saying is that, they are born dribbling a football. The football identity of the Brazilians has actively been used to campaign and attract different happenings in Brazil. Internationally, President Lula advertised Brazil as a football nation full of culture, with samba, carnival, beaches and beautiful bodies. This rich culture attracted FDI, the interest of FIFA and IOC and of course tourists. By playing

on the Brazilians football identity, President Lula was able to get the population excited about hosting the MSEs, with little knowledge of the consequences.

6.1.1. What Gentrification Theory is Relevant?

Lay's theory of the creation of possible gentrifiers, includes a change in industry and lifestyle (Hamnett, 1991, pp. 183, 185). Rio de Janeiro has gone through a transformation from an industrial city, to a globalized modern city, with high consumption. The strong elite and the new middle-class has become the gentrifiers, together with an international interest for the merging "global city", which has caused increasing real estate prices. This fits Lay's gentrification theory, where the possible gentrifiers are demanding new urban areas full of modern consumption offers, like stores, cafés and culture, which artists of different styles are contributing on creating, and increased safety in these areas. Lay's theory does not explain the increased state intervention in the gentrification process in Rio de Janeiro; therefore, it is not sufficient to explain gentrification in this case alone.

Smith uses economic profit and the rent gap' theory to explain the gentrification processes. As explained in the theory chapter, the rent gap is when the ground rent of an area has the potential to increase and capital can flow back to the investors (Smith, 1979, p. 546). Rio de Janeiro has had high rent gaps in central- and sportive areas, which have been able to increase profit by gentrify these. In Rio de Janeiro, the state-led urban development projects have managed to use the rent gap in the city centre and in the areas surrounding the larger sportive arenas preparing to host the events of FIFA and IOC. Smith's theory of the rent gap as the main reason for gentrification is not comprehensive either, because societies are more complex and cannot be explained only by economics.

As we have seen, for gentrification to occur there needs to be possible gentrifiers. In Rio de Janeiro, the gentrifiers have been international investors, consumers and the Brazilian formal housing market. Rio de Janeiro's favelas are rich on cultural capital that has attracted foreigners and the middle class. With increasing prices the urban poor have moved out of the favelas to more affordable housing, which again has led to sub-gentrification (Lee, 2003 in Cummings, 2015, p. 89) where low-income families are pushed out and replaces even lower-income families in a new place. Urbanization of the peripheries is one of the scopes of 'generalisation of gentrification'. Therefore, a combination of Lay's possible gentrifiers, Smith's theory of the

rent gap and the state-led policies as the main drivers for gentrification should be helpful to understand the urban situation of Rio de Janeiro. The use of MSEs as strategy for economic growth and gentrification is necessary to be aware of when looking at the urban processes of Rio de Janeiro the latest decades.

Can it be that Smith's theory of 'generalization of gentrification' is the emerging fourth wave of gentrification occurring in Rio de Janeiro? In-situ gentrification, urban expansion and beautification at the expense of urban poor is the 'generalization of gentrification' seen in Rio de Janeiro (Cummings, 2015, p. 84). 'Generalization of gentrification' here is evident because it fulfils almost all five characteristics Smith elaborates. (1) The changing role of state involvement in the gentrification process is evident in Rio de Janeiro where the government has actively used MSEs to enable gentrification of the city, a strategic move to become a "global city". Social housing programs have been used to offer urban poor new homes further away from the new, trendy areas, or the large sportive arenas. Gentrification has been implemented in urban planning of the new, modern city. (2) Increased use of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to redevelop the city, where the government has made exceptions for private and international firms to invest, with for instance tax cuts and government funding of projects. This reduces the risk of investing in redevelopment for the firms collaborating with the government (Smith, 2002, pp. 441-443). This has made it more favourable for private firms to invest and almost all developments in Rio de Janeiro since 2009 are based on PPP and thus almost impossible for small firms to land the same contracts.

(3) Large amount of people have been evicted from their homes to make space for the gentrification processes. In Rio de Janeiro, gentrification has contributed to dislocation of many urban poor, causing even lousier situations than they originally had. Favela evictions in Rio de Janeiro are usually unfair and inhuman. Forced evictions is not a new phenomenon in Rio de Janeiro, as favela clearance was state-led during the dictatorship in 1964-1985. After the dictatorship, the democracy changed focus to social justice and equity. But since the MSEs entered development, urban poor protective laws have been used towards their aim to clear favelas of favela dwellers instead of protecting them (Cummings, 2015, pp. 84-85). MSEs have given the government an opportunity to speed the process and legalize more evictions, as the central favelas have become the new trendy urban place to be. In addition, the speed of the preparations for MSEs has not improved the condition of the practises.

(4) Job concentration in Rio de Janeiro has mainly been in the city centre, and has created residential areas in the centre and along the transport lines. In the first stages of gentrification, the process normally happened in the centre of cities, in Rio de Janeiro it has spread to the neighbourhoods close to the city centre and around sportive arenas as well. Since the demands have increased, from both the international and the national, the gentrification has spread to other parts of the city and does not only include residential purposes. This is one of the main characteristics of ‘generalization of gentrification’. The residents of Metrô Mangueira were not been replaced by higher classes, as the area was not planned for residential use, but rather as part of the gentrification of ‘*Maracanã and around*’. The gentrified, urban landscape of Maracanã, was planned as a landscape where poverty and favelas were not visible.

(5) Many gentrified areas include upgraded or new, safer housing units in addition to upgrading of other attractions, like shopping possibilities, cafés and art- or cultural offers (Smith, 2002, pp. 441-443). At Mangueira I and II there are no upgraded surrounding areas with shopping and cultural possibilities, but the access to the city has been improved by the passage bridge connecting Mangueira with the metro and train station and the Maracanã stadium. Mangueira is therefore a gentrified surrounding city-area.

6.1.2. Gentrification and urban poor

The expected gentrification process has been slower than planned, because of the urban poor’s resistance towards forced evictions from the favelas and other dissatisfactions with public spending. As seen in figure 5 at p. 44, this is one of the consequences in the linkages of gentrification – successfully staging social mobilization – by changing forms of citizenship and thereby influence the decisions made by the authorities to prevent even more delays in the gentrification processes. More about this later in this chapter. MSEs has accelerated the process of evictions by offering high claims of improved infrastructure and public security (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1134). Hosting MSEs has led to prioritisation of development strategies before housing rights of informal settlers. The incorporation of favelas into the new city picture has happened without the favela dwellers as the increasing land prices and forced removals have pushed dwellers out of the city (Braathen et al., 2016, p. 162), creating new chic, gentrified areas for tourist and higher-class population.

Social housing projects aiming at solving housing precariousness seem to have been a contributing factor in the increasing real estate prices as it has taken many urban poor out of their neighbourhoods, leaving others behind only to be pushed out by high rent and other high living costs later on. Before it was known that Rio de Janeiro was to host two large MSEs, real estate prices were stable in the favelas, and service prices were regulated in from of the distance to central areas, meaning that the prices inside the favelas was relatively low and in central places the prices was higher. This shows an already unequal society. When real estate prices started to increase after 2008, Rio de Janeiro became even more unequal (Gaffney, 2016, pp. 1135-1136) due to the pushing effects the increasing real estate prices had inside the favelas. Table 3 shows the real estate price in 2008 and in 2014 at various places in Rio de Janeiro and the percent increase in the same period. Meier is the most representative area for Mangueira in this table as it is the closest area to Mangueira, and the prices are the most similar.

Table 3: Retail residential sales price per square meter for selected Rio de Janeiro neighbourhoods, 2008-2014

Neighbourhood	February 2008 (R\$)	June 2014 (R\$)	Change (%)
Barra da Tijuca	4,643	9,533	205,3
Lapa	2,431	9,386	386,1
Flamengo	3,506	11,026	314,5
Copacabana	3,613	11,483	317,8
Laranjeiras	3,315	10,724	323,5
Centro	2,177	8,418	386,8
Tijuca	1,985	7,418	373,7
Vidigal	1,450	8,673	598,1
Meier	1,803	5,313	294,7
Rio de Janeiro			255,8

Table 3: Retrieved from (Gaffney, 2016, p. 5)

One of the characteristics of gentrification in Rio de Janeiro is the replacement of one social class with a wealthier. The indirect replacement in the city centre is where the poorest are pushed out because of increasing real estate prices and consumption costs. Sanitation and electricity have been installed in many upgraded favelas which is positive for those who can afford it, but the poorest and most vulnerable are again pushed further from the centre and to worse conditions than originally. These are the indirect consequences of gentrification. The direct effects of gentrification, on the other hand, have been the forced evictions of favela dwellers

due to upgrading, new infrastructure or new buildings that are typical for the gentrification process.

In 2009 it was announced that many favelas was to be removed before 2016. Metrô Mangueira was one of them (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017). The government of Rio de Janeiro has used the police and entrepreneurs for ‘*social cleaning*’ of attractive areas (D. d. C. P. d. C. e. O. d. R. d. Janeiro, 2015, p. 19). This process has affected thousands of people and forced evictions became a part of a strategy to make space for the new urban development plans. Forced evictions have been legalized due to events or plans of development supposed to serve the population in the area (Saborio, 2013, p. 137), but have had the opposite effect.

Examples of urbanization programs in Rio de Janeiro are the Federal Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), focusing on infrastructure and connecting the favelas with other parts of the city. The Morar Carioca is another program to urbanize, relocate and upgrade sanitation systems, schools and health services (Cummings, 2015, pp. 86-87). UPP was an attempt of the state to break up the criminal networks and provide security for the favela dwellers, as well as to reassert the sovereignty of favelas from the criminal gangs into the formal systems of the society (Cummings, 2015, pp. 85-86). According to Cummings (2015, pp. 84-85), social integration programs for security, the pacification of favelas, and urbanization has been clear gentrification attempts, and not services implemented for the benefit of the urban poor.

“The aggregate effects of these ‘social integration’ initiatives has been, and will be: intensified flows of capital and newcomers into favela; the subtraction of affordable housing stock around mega-event development hubs and their respective transportation connections; and new spaces of marginality set up in the peripheral, disconnected housing projects. In short, ‘social integration’ does not equal ‘social inclusion’.”
(Cummings, 2015, p. 87)

The government often justifies evictions by offering new and better housing standards. The problem is that the new social housing is normally far from employment, health and education opportunities. The excuses of resettlements are that the houses are in risk-areas or that the construction in itself is a risk. According to Davis (2007, p. 98), gentrification does not serve the urban poor forced to move even though they may get new houses outside the city. There

was no other reason to remove families from Metrô Mangureira except getting rid of visible poverty for the World Cup (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017).

As mentioned before, the area of Metrô Mangureira was planned to become a parking lot for the Maracanã football stadium. Later the plans changed to make an automobile store, but it was never finished. In the bidding to FIFA, Metrô Mangureira was not on the map, the space was used for parking. The evictions therefore happened for the logistics of the Maracanã stadium and the World Cup. The excuse the local government had for resettling people in Rio de Janeiro was that the plans the government had for the favela dwellers would formalise jobs and strengthen the economy. However, when the necessity of removing people disappears, the projects are dropped, and the initiated infrastructure are abandoned (Gaffney: personal interview 17.03.2017). Gaffney (personal interview 17.03.2017) believes that there would not have been any removals from Metrô Mangureira if it were not for the World Cup.

“What you saw on TV from Rio de Janeiro during the World Cup and the Olympics was all the governments make-up, hiding the real situation of Rio, and now the make-up is washing away. What do we have left? A football stadium we cannot afford and people without jobs, because their new homes is too far from the city⁵”. – Taxi driver in Rio de Janeiro (personal communication, 02.02.2017, on my way back from the city centre to Meier).

According to Faulhaber (personal interview 02.02.17), the government did not know what they wanted to do with the area of Metrô Mangureira. He claims that the idea of making a parking lot and then later changing the plans was just excuses to get poverty out of sight from the Maracanã stadium. Mangureira is highly visible from the metro station of Maracanã, something that does not match the global image Rio de Janeiro’s planners and government strives for (Steinbrink, 2013, p. 133). The local government therefore planned to put up a large poster at the metro station of Maracanã, to block the view of Mangureira. This did not happen as the favela dwellers protested.

Pursuing neo-liberal strategies like hosting MSEs, have played an important role in real estate price increase in Rio de Janeiro, but resistance towards the effects of gentrification has slowed

⁵ This is a statement, not a direct quote. It is retold as I recall it from the taxi, I wrote it down the same day so that it would be the most accurate it could be.

the process (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1147). The gentrification of Rio de Janeiro has created conflicts between the government and the urban poor (Gaffney, 2016, p. 1133). Many criticise gentrification for displacing urban poor, to make room for the new or upgraded urban layout, and wealthier classes replacing the poor residents (Sutton, 2014). This is evident in Rio de Janeiro where more than forty thousand people have been evicted to make space for the new urban plans, preparing the city to host some of the world's largest MSEs in just a few years. The international expectations to the host cities has created enormous pressure on the Brazilian state, and especially on the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, which has resorted to fast, short-term development decisions (C. M. Sørbye, 2013) and strategic use of police violence to speed the evictions. The government was not expecting all the demonstrations around Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro, which made the government to take decisions to hide or solve, what was, from the political point of view, seen as the problem, the mobilizers.

6.1.3. Security and (Social-) Gated Communities

Violence in Brazil, especially in Rio de Janeiro, has increased in the last few decades, both from the criminals and the police (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 202). When I was walking up the hillside of the complex of Mangueira, I interviewed various criminals. They themselves expressed concerns about the increasing violence inside the favelas. Violence in Rio de Janeiro is again getting worse after a period of standstill with the presence of UPP. Many criminals left the favelas when UPP came in, but when the police withdrew their presence the criminals came back. People that had something to do with the UPP, like selling them lunches, or attending their projects, are targets of revenge. The criminals are punishing people for helping UPP while the criminals were away. In addition, rival criminal gangs from other cities are taking advantage of the chaotic situation and are trying to take over the drug business in the area, which again creates confusion and violence between different criminal gangs. The violence is affecting innocent favela dwellers, as they are caught in the middle of gangster war zones.

There is an increasing demand for security in the wealthier parts (Davis, 2007, p. 116) of Rio de Janeiro. The tall apartment buildings with gatekeepers and security twenty-four seven, also called Gated Communities (GC), represent urban segregation that have proved to benefit the middle class and the elite, and has become a characteristic of gentrification. Recent studies from the United States shows new trends of social housing that develop projects copying GCs (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, p. 181). I observed this style on the Minha Casa Minha Vida

(MCMV) projects I visited in Rio de Janeiro as well. How does this affect the urban poor living in GCs without the same economic opportunities as the people normally living in these trendy structures?

The development of GCs is a trend we find in Rio de Janeiro as well as in the United States, not just in gentrified areas, but social housing projects are copying the style. Houses provided by MCMV are walled in with gate-keepers for safety. The MCMV complexes stand out in the urban landscape of Mangueira, due to the modern construction and security measures. They are apartment blocks, with large gates and gatekeepers. Maintenance of the common areas requires collective responsibility of the residents, but lacking information and awareness about the legal frameworks of self-controlled maintenance, can be felt as limiting their freedom. The residents of Mangueira I and II told me they missed the freedom of having people over for barbeque or setting out pools for the children to play. This might be some of the restrictions in the legal framework for the families living in GCs. *“The price of ‘total’ security is the loss of many such minor liberties”* (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005, p. 183). When resettled from your home to a social housing, this is not something you choose.

The people resettled from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira I and II are more excluded from the rest of the community of Mangueira now than before because of the physical separation from the outside, in their new living situations. Metrô Mangueira was physically separated from the complex of Mangueira by the railways, as demonstrated in figure 4 at p. 24. Even so, Metrô Mangueira was included in the society of Mangueira as an extension of the favela. The way the MCMV houses are constructed resemble the apartment buildings of the gentrified inner-city areas, something that does not reflect the economic situation of the residents. In the MCMV apartments of Mangueira I and II, the residents are now living *in* the complex of Mangueira but are physically separated by the tall walls.

Criminal gangs rooted in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods offer services not provided by the state to the citizens and creates strong and dangerous loyalty between the favela dwellers and the criminal gangs (Holston, 2009a, p. 14). Categorization of the residents of Mangueira I and II as wealthier than the rest of the favela makes them more vulnerable because the criminal gang will not provide them the same security as they offer the rest of Mangueira. At the same time, they do not have the resources to get the security elsewhere as they are thought of as poor by the rest of society. The criminal gangs believe the residents can pay for security services and

that the tall walls surrounding the buildings protect them enough as the infrastructure of the MCMV houses is built as GCs. These are typical characteristics of the gentrified areas of Rio de Janeiro, which reeks of wealth, and creates an impression that the residents are richer than the rest of the favela even though that is not the case. In addition, the criminal gangs use the walled area as strategic hiding places when the police are after them, as the police are less likely to enter GCs to look for criminals. This makes the residents of Mangureira I vulnerable and more exposed to be caught up in the middle of crossfires and the war between the police and the criminals.

Figure 8: Photo of the entrance to Mangureira II



Figure 8: Entrance to Mangureira II. Private photo, taken the 17.02.2017

The residents of Mangureira I and II have to pay more taxes to the criminal gangs than the other residents in Mangureira, as it looks like they can afford it. Another aspect of the separation and the fact that the residents are seen as wealthier can be a status boost for some of the residents, but they are still segregated from the rest of the society as they are from the favela. The problem with security in MCMV projects like Mangureira I and II, is that the residents become vulnerable because they stand out from the surrounding neighbourhoods. The problem for MCMV and Mangureira I and II is the failure of providing the security a GCs should provide. The power of

the criminal gang of Mangureira, and the access hole they have in the back of Mangureira I make the residents more exposed to crime due to the image of wealth by living in GCs without actually having the security and economy to provide it. Even though the MCMV programs use the same structures of GCs does not change the economic situation of the families receiving the apartments.

People living in MCMV's GCs are more vulnerable as they cannot meet the expectations people have to them. Figure 8 shows the gate that blocks the entrance of Mangureira II. In Mangureira I and II, I was told that they are included in the complex of Mangureira when it comes to paying taxes, but not in the activities and the security the criminal gangs provide for the dwellers of Mangureira. The criminal gangs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have a policy of taking care of their community, which also means providing the security the state does not provide for them (personal communication with favela dweller from the complex of Mangureira, February 2017). This creates segregation of the families in the MCMV condominiums at two levels; on one side they are being segregated by the other favela dwellers for the image of '*not being poor*' any more, and on the other side by the state and the elite for being poor and not affording their place in the urban city.

6.2. Social Mobilization at Metrô Mangureira

In the preparation time for the MSEs Rio de Janeiro was pictured as 'the wonderful city', "*Cidade Maravilhosa*" in Portuguese, on international media, posters, and so on. Beaches, culture, music, sun, nice food and beautiful people were used in the advertising. However, what did Brazil hide? Oliveira, Sanchez, Tanaka, and Monteiro (2016, p. 113) state that the city of Rio de Janeiro is; "*wonderfully violent, unequal and unjust, the city express itself through the conflicts of habitants gathering resisting the practical consequences, especially the successful selling of the idea of a cozy, receptive and spectacular city*"⁶ (Oliveira et al., 2016, p. 113).

Protesters and mobilizers use the city as a stage for demanding social justice, and thereby challenge the image of Rio de Janeiro as a global peaceful city. Social mobilization is characterized by collective actions to trigger positive, social change in a situation threatened by negative interventions from outside the community. I have chosen to use the case of Metrô Mangureira, that has directly been affected by MSEs due to its locality close to the Maracanã

⁶ My translation from Portuguese.

football stadium. With resistance and social mobilization unplanned changes can happen, like changing plans of resettlement (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 72).

Social mobilizations are becoming more frequent in Brazil as a whole. People mobilize and protest to the effects of globalization and neoliberal economic policies (Johnston & Almeida, 2006, p. 3). Urbanization has been important for capital surplus, and has laid the ground for collective actions and for the rights to the city (Harvey, 2012, pp. 22-24), which in Rio de Janeiro was a claim of the massive movements in the 1980's. If dwellers are aware of the protective laws that exists and manage to use them as tools, it can strengthen their mobilizations. For example, the Municipal Law states that urban dwellers cannot be moved more than 7 km away from their original homes (Arrigoitia, 2017, p. 76). This knowledge can be used in a social movement for housing rights as it was actively used in the social mobilization at Metrô Mangureira.

According to several of my informants, the residents of Metrô Mangureira were not invited to participate in the planning of *Maracanã and around*. The municipality and the Public Olympic authority together with PPP made the plans without inviting people being affected by the changes, into the process. The information about the plan for Metrô Mangureira, and the impact it would have on their lives came unexpected for the residents in 2010. Some residents were frightened due to Rio de Janeiro's history of favela clearance and did not think resistance would lead to any changes, as the brutality of the military police has shown to stop similar resistance by threatening and beating the protesters. This created a division of collective action in the beginning of the mobilization due to concerns about the outcome, which brings us to the fifth modality of mobilization, which I will come back to shortly. The citizens were concerned that the first offer would be the only one and they were afraid of the police. When the struggles first started, the government sent in the military police using brutal force to silence the residents of Metrô Mangureira. This demonstration of power was normal during the military dictatorship, and has been re-established as a strategy for evictions associated with MSEs.

Through the social mobilization for the right to be included in the process of creating the city and the right for housing close by, the modalities of social mobilizations mentioned by Dupont et al. (2016, p. 197) are visible in the struggles of Metrô Mangureira. Since I collected data about the experiences of the former residents of Metrô Mangureira from one particular phenomenon, I do not have any evidence of everyday resilience before the threats of removals

from Metrô Mangueira. The residents however, actively used confrontational mobilization when the government threatened with removals. For their demands to be heard, they used invented spaces actively in the social mobilization. This answers the first of the three *who* – who participate – where the mobilizers use invented space for participation. The community committee created vertical- and horizontal linkages with strategic actors knowledgeable of the juridical system, with established global network and local support. During the struggles at Metrô Mangueira using the vertical linkages, public defenders argued for right to social housing close to Mangueira, using the juridical system, referring to the Municipal Law. Students and professors at State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) helped the Committee of Metrô Mangueira in formulating their demands to the city government. Lastly, the international media drew attention to the human right violations taking place in the favela, creating global pressure on the government.

The horizontal linkage the committee of Metro Mangueira established was a collaboration with other neighbourhoods in similar positions. Afraid of leaving their houses unwatched, the committee of Metrô Mangueira formed a group of guards with other communities; consistent mostly of women helping each other to guard their houses when they were not at home, to prevent the government demolishing the houses while nobody was there. This community guard collaboration demonstrates how the state created insecurity and instability as a kind of state terror. In addition, the physical instability created by the demolition of houses in between living units, made life more difficult in an already marginalized and vulnerable neighbourhood.

“During that time the community at the Metrô passed on local TV as well as international TV. The media came and was shocked, there was battles in the streets, and they were treating us as cockroaches. The media showed that people were suffering. Therefore, for it not to look bad for the Municipal, they said they would resolve it. That was when Eduardo Paes came and made an agreement about Mangueira I⁷” explained by one of the former families of Metrô Mangueira (personal interview, february 2017).

After the first attempt to remove the families from Metrô Mangueira to Cosmos, the pressure of the mobilization forced the government to make changes. The mayor and governor of Rio de Janeiro then invited the community to a meeting, which shows that the mobilizers at Metrô

⁷ Direct quote, translated by me from Portuguese

Mangueira managed to define the agenda, as the authorities reconsidered their plans. This is the answer to the second *who* – who defines the agenda. This is also the forth modality of social mobilization where there is a cooperation between the state and the mobilizers in an invited space. Mangueira I was offered to some of the residents, hoping it would demobilize the social mobilization of Metrô Mangueira. When there were no more apartments available in Mangueira I, the government again tried to resettle people to Cosmos.

After another round of confrontational mobilization during almost one year, the mayor and the governor invited to a new meeting where Mangueira II was offered. The strength of the social mobilization at Metrô Mangueira managed to influence the government's decision, and did not let the intentions of the cooperation weaken the mobilizers. This shows that Metrô Mangueira's social movement managed to set the rules for the process. This is the third *who* – who sets the rule - the government sat the rule for how they would act when the citizens of Rio de Janeiro resisted, but Metrô Mangueira showed that it is possible to change the course of development. In the end, the government managed to silence the residence as the mobilization faded after the houses in Mangueira I and II were ready.

Nuijten (2013, pp. 11-12) states that the understanding of citizenship in the Brazilian favelas is seen as patronage, all they receive from politicians are seen as gifts, and that the citizens do not think they have any obligations or duties to the state. Clientelism is seen as a part of the practices of citizenship, and is used by politicians to buy votes. Many are used to empty promises and favela dwellers are normally forgotten by the authorities after elections. Many favela dwellers do not see services for basic need as a right (Nuijten, 2013, pp. 11-12, 14), but as gifts and exchange of favours, something they are used to wrap their life around. When I asked how the government divided the apartments of Mangueira I and II between the residents of Metrô Mangueira, they said that they did not have the chance to choose, but I got hints that some people had agreements with the politicians, and got to choose anyway. This shows that there could have been some relations of clientelism in the negotiations in Metrô Mangueira as well.

Active citizenship is practised when the daily situation is threatened, after the citizens of Metrô Mangueira got better offers of housing, the mobilization have faded. Throughout history in Rio de Janeiro, there has been social mobilizations where urban poor demand rights and access to land ownership, urban upgrading, infrastructure and security (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 17). The social movements in the 1970's and 1980's were about demanding democracy. These

mobilizations turned into NGO's in the 1990's, which have been supportive of the new social movements after 2010 (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 186). There is a pattern of phases of mobilization and demobilization alternates in Rio de Janeiro. During the social mobilization at Metrô Mangueira, there were similar movements other places in Rio de Janeiro. When these movements faded, other collective actions build on the ground of past movements, as for example with the June 2013 mass protests. When this movement also faded, new smaller movements emerged. The mobilization of Metrô Mangueira and their victory were important for their livelihoods, but also for other favela dwellers and new mobilizations in Rio de Janeiro that eventually led to the mass-protests of June 2013. The small successful mobilizations are important because they show that it is worth it, it is possible and it creates awareness around the rights to the city.

6.2.1. Citizenship

The right to the city is not just access to city resources, but also the possibility to change the city, some kind of shaping power over the process of urbanization. The right to the city has been dominated by private interests, and has been shaped by a small political elite (Harvey, 2012, pp. 4-5, 22-24), and thus difficult for urban poor to use this right. In Rio de Janeiro, urban poor are denied access to use the right to the city. The key of social mobilization in Rio de Janeiro has been fighting for the right to the city, or to claim right through the city directly or indirectly by demanding rights to a place in urban space. Individualistic intentions or not, collective actions fighting for matters threatening daily urban life due to gentrification, dislocation or other urban issues, have been the urban poor's '*cry for help*' (Harvey, 2012, pp. xii - xiii, 3). For the citizens of Metrô Mangueira, urban citizenship has been important to be able for defining citizens' rights and possibilities for participation.

Differentiated citizenship applies for favela dwellers in Rio de Janeiro in the sense that they do not have the same access to basic services, legal rights and other resources the city offers (Xavier & Magalhães, 2003, p. 17). The fact that some people have privileged rights in the Brazilian society has been accepted due to the history of differentiated citizenship in Brazil. More than two hundred years of exclusion from property and political rights, misrule of law and residential illegality, a trend that is hard to change. When the democracy does not offer open spaces for participation, and the life of urban poor are threatened, the citizens tend to form civic networks to make claims to the government (Braathen et al., 2014; Dupont et al., 2016, p.

196). Urban poor claiming their right to the city through social mobilizations can expand and create new forms of citizenship (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 198).

6.2.2. Insurgent Citizenship

Urban poor living in informal settlements in the cities and in the peripheries can through social mobilization create new forms of citizenship. As with the social mobilization of Metrô Mangueira, the insurgent citizenship created was based on the generation of an alternative space for participation, a new understanding of their rights and the transformation of state-public relation (Holston, 2009b, pp. 255-256). The city is constructed and reconstructed through state interventions; people's insurgent practices can make the state respond in forms of changes in policies. In this way, the making of the city is a synoptic process with inputs from the state as well as from the citizens (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 52). The social mobilization of Metrô Mangueira challenged the differentiated citizenship in Rio de Janeiro by claiming their rights to equal treatment of livelihood, and the access to the city, which led to change.

Rio de Janeiro has seen many forced evictions throughout history, but rarely do the favela dwellers have any chance of participating in the decision making of what will happen in their neighbourhoods or where they have to move. When Metrô Mangueira was threatened by resettlements, some families accepted the first offers of housing in the peripheries of Rio de Janeiro. The remaining community started fighting for housing alternatives close by, and in 2011 the first complex, Mangueira I, was ready to host a part of the residents (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015, p. 100), and in 2012 Mangueira II was ready for more families from Metrô Mangueira. Normally in the cases of forced evictions, the families that accepts the first offers are the ones ending up with the best deals, but in the case of Metrô Mangueira, it was the ones that kept on fighting, using invented space through social mobilization, that got the best deals (Junior et al., 2015, pp. 240-242). Even though the residents of Metrô Mangueira had to leave their homes in the old neighbourhood, the fact that they managed to get new housing close by is a victory, not just for them, but also for other favela dwellers in similar situations.

Insurgent citizenship can be born in places where the expectations of the state is not fulfilled or where human rights is not provided (Dupont et al., 2016, p. 193). At Metrô Mangueira the expectations of the state was low as they were used to empty promises from authorities. Their awareness of their rights to new homes less than 7 km away from Metrô Mangueira, and the

violent violations on their human rights by the military police contributed to the need of invented space, to claim their rights of housing and to be heard. The invented space of insurgent citizenship for Metrô Mangueira was created by the social mobilization of the resistance to the forced removals and demolition of their houses. Metrô Mangueira's active use of invented space for participation has contributed to the creation of an insurgent citizenship. There has been a political transformation where the municipality of Rio de Janeiro had to take the voices of Metrô Mangueira into consideration and change the plans. The struggle of urban life and housing rights caused the creation of insurgent citizenship in this case.

Even though the residents were happy that they managed to change the course of the plans with their mobilization and struggles, they did not actually gain possibilities to participate in the decisions about Mangueira I and II. However, what they had accomplished was to create a platform through invented space and pressured the authorities to take actions. This shows that the citizens of Metrô Mangueira created insurgent citizenship for themselves and managed to shape the urban space of Mangueira where they now live.

“Even though they may have suffered more than many other favelas, they may also have better results from the Prefeitura⁸, and I do not know if that is because of their visibility in the media or if it is because of other reasons” (Gaffney: personal interview, 17.03.2017).

Even in social mobilizations that are not well organized, international support can help the mobilization turn the attention towards their concerns and pressures the state to respond to it. In the protests of June 2013, the citizens wanted other changes in the cities than the gentrification policies that limited the access to the city for many people. The municipality of Rio de Janeiro decided to resettle the families from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira I and II as a reaction to the strong mobilization the citizens managed to achieve, by using invented space of insurgent citizenship to participate in the planning of the city. In the case of Metrô Mangueira, it is clear that the government initiated the agenda, but the social mobilization managed to influence the local government to reevaluate and change the plans. This victory was of enormous importance for the lives of the residents gaining the apartments, but also for other social mobilizations in Rio de Janeiro. The efforts put pressure on the government and resulted

⁸ The Municipality of Rio de Janeiro

in the mobilizers getting their rights to the city. The steady ground of the mobilization combined with strong female leadership in the Committee of Metrô Mangueira may have had a strong influence on the local government and pressured the authorities to change the policies and plans of the neighbourhood.

Many ‘do’ citizenship without knowing it by creating actions when situations constrain their space of liberty or access to the city (Blokland et al., 2015, p. 663). By using the power of their newly created insurgent citizenship, it is possible to achieve change. I believe this is what happened at Metrô Mangueira.

6.3. Linking Gentrification, Social Mobilization and Citizenship at Metrô Mangueira

Large scale gentrification policies have been pushed through in urban planning in Rio de Janeiro in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Summer Olympics 2016. Renewal of urban landscape, new infrastructure, transport systems, residential areas and sportive arenas, the face of the city has become modern. Massive amounts of investments were implemented in the upgrading of the Maracanã football stadium and the surrounding areas, a sub-gentrification of the city centre. A few hundred meters away is the favela, Metrô Mangueira which was badly affected by the gentrification of the area. If we look at figure 5 at p. 44, we recognise the same linkages demonstrated in the figure in the case of Metrô Mangueira. The citizens at Metrô Mangueira had limited or no possibilities to participate in the planning process and were evicted from their homes due to beautification for the World Cup.

The citizens of Metrô Mangueira formed a civic network to resist the changes, but were met by the brutality of the military police. The formation of the community committee was vital for the social mobilization of the small neighbourhood. The community committee of Metrô Mangueira created linkages with public defenders, the UERJ and the international media, as well as with other communities in similar positions, to increase their knowledge and strengthen the mobilization. The practice of invented space for participation to get their demands and voices heard, led to the creation of a new form of citizenship, insurgent citizenship. There can be shifting use between invented and invited spaces of participation. As for the case of Metrô Mangueira, the government invited the citizens to a meeting when the pressure got intense, and tried to demobilize the mobilization by offering some of the citizens apartments close by.

A second round of confrontational mobilization and use of invented space for participation occurred at Metrô Manguera before they again were invited to a new meeting where the rest of the residents were offered apartments close by as well. The social mobilization at Metrô Manguera and the creation of insurgent citizenship is a fight for the right to the city, as the basis of the mobilization of Metrô Manguera was urban residence and the right to participate in the planning of the urban space that affects their livelihood (Holston, 2009b, p. 257). The residents of Metrô Manguera participated through an invented space and managed to define the agenda by pressure the authorities to rethink their decisions about the dislocation of the favela. In this sense, the residents challenged the differentiated citizenship in Brazil, and demanded a right to a place in the city. The social mobilization at Metrô Manguera slowed the gentrification process of the *Maracanã and around*, and in February 2017, the plans were still not finished.

7. Concluding remarks

In this thesis, I have looked at what experiences the former residents of Metrô Manguera, now living in Manguera I and II, have from the evictions from Metrô Manguera. I have explored if the relocations can be related to the recent Mega-Sports Events (MSE), the World Cup 2014 and Summer Olympics 2016, in Rio de Janeiro and if it could be explained in a gentrification perspective. Lastly, I have explored in what way the residents of Metrô Manguera participated in the planning process before, during and after the removals, and how they were able to influence the authorities change of plans for the residents residential situation.

Gaining access to the field was my biggest challenge in the research. In Rio de Janeiro, security is an issue, and as a foreign, female researcher, I had to take some extra precautions. Observations done in the complex of Manguera was of great importance for the understanding of the security situation in Manguera and in Rio de Janeiro in general. With the limited time I had in the field, I am very pleased with the experiences I made in Rio de Janeiro. Much of it due to my fluency in the Portuguese language and the contacts I manage to establish in the field. With limited time, an effective way of collecting data was interviews, and I conducted several unstructured and semi-structures interviews, as well as one focus group and participant observations.

The purpose of hosting the MSEs was to grow as a nation and to erase the stigma of being a developing country. The short-termed developments seen in Rio de Janeiro have on the contrary

resulted in increased inequalities in an already unequal society. Rio de Janeiro has actively used MSEs in urban planning to be able to gentrify the city to provide a good image to the outside world and becoming a “global city”. In addition for Brazil to gain international recognition as a developed country. Hosting MSEs, like the Olympics and the World Cup, means offering international standards of sport arenas and security as well as other city resources. For Rio de Janeiro, this has meant expensive large-scale urban development projects, which has resulted in thousands of forced evictions. The aim of the government has been to gentrify the city to higher standards to reduce poverty and to enter the global map of great powers that have the ability to influence on a global scale. Bad management and lack of public participation have resulted in fast, short-termed decisions.

The theories of gentrification was useful because of Rio de Janeiro’s implementation of gentrification in urban planning for the preparations for hosting the World Cup 2014 and the Summer Olympics 2016. To be able to see the implications it had for the residents of Metrô Mangueira, it was necessary to look at the gentrification politics and urban planning of Rio de Janeiro as a whole. As a reaction to the changes of gentrification, the citizens of Metrô Mangueira became active in social mobilization due to lacking possibilities to participate in the planning process of urban upgrading of “*Maracanã and around*”, which affected their livelihoods. To be able to reach the local governments and make their voices heard, the former residents of Metrô Mangueira managed to change the form of their citizenship. Through invented spaces of participation, in insurgent citizenship the citizens managed to influence the authorities to make another direction than first planned. The pressure the strong mobilization of Metrô Mangueira put on local authorities resulted in changing plans of new residential offers to compensate for the evictions.

Gentrification is an urban renewal process that often includes replacing one social class with a wealthier one. To explain the gentrification processes Rio de Janeiro has experienced, Lay’s theory of the creation of gentrifiers and Smith’s theory of the rent gap are important tools. The gentrifiers have been the elite, middle class and an increased international interest in the real estate market and a growing rent gap. The main characteristics of ‘generalization of gentrification’ in Rio de Janeiro have been the state-led gentrification, meaning that gentrification has been included in urban development planning. Rio de Janeiro has seen many

forced evictions the last couple of decades, which have caused discontent in the population and a wave of social mobilizations.

When external factors threaten livelihoods, people tend to form civil networks and be active in social mobilizations. Where the democracy does not work and citizens do not have any possibility to participate, invented spaces can be created in the pursuit of new forms of citizenship, for which I have used the term insurgent citizenship. Insurgent citizenship is a practice where marginalized people get their voices heard and claim their rights for basic needs and a right to the city. What I found in the case of Metrô Mangueira was that the struggles were long, but with the support offered by vertical and horizontal linkages with strategic people and organisations, they managed to create a platform to influence the authorities.

When the struggles at Metrô Mangueira started, the residents were not prepared. The government offered the residents housing in Cosmos, 70 km away, and a two days' notice eviction. The residents at Metrô Mangueira protested and the military police met the protesters with batons and tear gas. They soon mobilized, and a group of people, mostly women, formed a community committee. The government did not expect a strong social mobilization to resist the changes.

Violence and fear of the police can hinder social mobilization, but the international media showed the world the violent violations infringed on their human rights. This put enormous pressure on the government that was trying to show the world they were becoming a "global city". All of my informants agreed that the combination of support and international media coverage was the reason the local government changed the plans and offered them Mangueira I and II instead of the far away housing in Cosmos.

Even though Metrô Mangueira had managed in certain ways to set the rule of this movement, the municipality did not let them take too much power. The municipality limited the movement by not including them in the planning of Mangueira I and II and the division of apartments. However, the municipality did change the plans of moving the families from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira I and II instead of Cosmos, which showed that the social mobilization and the use of insurgent citizenship was effective for the residents of Metrô Mangueira.

What I did not expect to find was how the structure of the MCMV complexes are contributing to segregate the residents of Mangueira I and II, creating new difficult life-situations. The way the MCMV complexes adopt the style of Gated Communities (GC) is a form of gentrification of the favelas. The layout of Mangueira I and II stands out from the rest of Mangueira due to its modern building structure. Living in GCs with gatekeepers for security is one of the characteristics of ‘generalization of gentrification’ in the rich centre of Rio de Janeiro. The problem is that the citizens living in these social-GCs does not have the economy to support the standard of this kind of living. The residents ends up being differentiated at two levels, as “rich” on one side by the rest of the favela, and as “poor” on the other hand from the rest of the society in Rio de Janeiro.

The criminal gang in the favela overlooks the economic fact of the people living in Mangueira I and II, and claims more taxes from them than from other favela dwellers, due to the physical appearance of the buildings. This contributes to push the most vulnerable people out of the MCMV houses, and they need to find more affordable houses in other neighbourhoods. There is a generalized expectation in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro that the criminal gangs provide the security to the favela residents, a security that the state fails to provide. At Metrô Mangueira, the criminals provided the residents security as they were seen as part of the favela. In Mangueira I and II they are now more exposed to crime as they do not have the protection from neither the criminals nor the state and cannot afford to pay for legal external security services.

For further research, it would be interesting to do a similar research with former residents of Metrô Mangueira now living in Cosmos, Santa Cruz and Triagem, to find out if they have similar experiences from the evictions as the ones living in Mangueira I and II. Another interesting theme would be to do a more in depth study on the effects social-GCs have on urban poor living in these modern, gentrified areas without the economy of maintaining it. To explore what this does to their daily situation, their quality of life, and the society they live in.

Gentrification has become a global pattern, and emerging “global cities” all over the world are becoming equal in appearance. Throughout the work with this thesis, I have opened my eyes for gentrification visible in Norway, and there is one place in particular that has caught my interest; Tøyen. It would be interesting to see how gentrification has occurred in Oslo as a result

of the area-based policies⁹. A comparison of the effects it have on the most vulnerable people in society, between Oslo and a city in a developing country like Brazil, would be interesting. Even though the societies are very different and the social situation of the marginalized differ as well, there are many similarities in the processes of gentrification and the outcomes in the different context of the countries. In the next section, I have some final thoughts on the current situation in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. These are also interesting themes to follow upon if the opportunity allows it.

7.1. Final thoughts¹⁰

How can so much efforts be put into becoming an international, respected, “global city”, when these efforts are not sustainable? All the money spent, all the changes made, all the people evicted from their homes, and all the unfinished projects. For what purposes? After the Olympic Games ended, Rio de Janeiro has come to a standstill. What was a beautiful, over the top, football stadium that hosted two of largest MSEs in the world, is not in use. Passing the Maracanã football stadium in the beginning of 2017, I felt the sadness the people had for losing their stadium, their hopes, seeing their city darken. How can the state promote urban policies that make people suffer for the sports arenas to be at its maximum, to host the largest MSEs Latin America has ever hosted, and just half a year later let it be abandoned, and destroyed. Why were thousands of people evicted? For what was all the public money spent? Is this the social legacy FIFA and IOC wants to leave behind?

The agenda of Rio de Janeiro has changed dramatically after the end of the MSEs, now it is all about damage control. Brazil and Rio de Janeiro was probably not ready for these kinds of events, and did not have a plan after the MSEs. The short-termed plans of hosting the MSEs and gentrifying the city have been implemented. Rio de Janeiro, what is your next move?

New social mobilizations are visible in the streets of Brazil. The MSEs have ended, but the political mess is rocking the democracy. In May 2016, President Dilma Rousseff was forced to resign due to impeachment. She was accused of unlawful accounting of state finances, and later on she was accused on illegal use of money in the electoral campaign in 2014. Vice-president Temer, took over Dilma’s mandate for the rest of the period (CIA, 2017). The political tension

⁹ Områdeløft

¹⁰ The time of writing the final thoughts; November 2017

is undermining the credibility of the political order in Brazil, as President Temer is accused of being more involved in the corruption scandal called 'Operation Car Wash' (Lava Jato) than Dilma was (NRK, 06.06.2017). In June 2017, president Temer was considered for impeachment as well, but the Brazilian Supreme Court decided he could stay on for the rest of Dilma's time, which ends in 2018. People have been mobilizing, wanting a new democratic election of presidency, not for the judicial system to make the decision. Many people, call Temer's presidency a coup d'état.

After my fieldwork I have been following several of my informants on social media, and the security issues seems to become worse. One evening I got a message on my cell phone about shooting in one of the streets in Mangueira and parents were advised not to pick up their children at the local school. The residents' association of Mangueira led a constant dialogue with the teachers, making sure the children were safe inside the school building. Another messages followed later the same day telling about shooting to other streets. The residents referred to the situation discussed on the social media as a "war", the war between the police and the criminal gangs that had ceased when UPP came into the favelas a few years before, but that was now more active than ever. How will the security situation in Rio de Janeiro develop?

8. Resources

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9. Attachments

Attachment 1: Introduction to participation in the research

Inquérito de participação no projeto de pesquisa

”Como os megaeventos (a Copa do Mundo 2014 e as Olypiadas 2016) afetou o planejamento urbana na Mangueira, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil”

Antecedentes e Propósito

Mi chamo Isabella M. Facconi. Sou estudante na Universidade de Agder, na Noruega. Estou fazendo um mestrando chamado “Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Global, com especialização em Gestão do Desenvolvimento”. O meu projeto é: Como os megaeventos afetou o planejamento Urbana na Mangueira? – Qual foram os efeitos na vida diariamente dos moradores da Mangueira (e Mangueira I e II)?

Eu quero falar com moradores (famílias) da Mangueira, com os que trabalha nas associações/projetos sociais da Mangueira e os moradores (famílias) na Mangueira I e II, que ganharão apartamentos do projeto publico; Minha casa, Minha vida.

Que consiste na participação na pesquisa?

Para poder ter um compreensão melhor da situação diariamente das pessoas morando na Mangueira, quero fazer entrevistas e observações no bairro. As entrevistas vão durar entre 20-60 minutos. O objetivo que espero conseguir é as experiências dos moradores sobre os efeitos que os megaeventos têm na situação diariamente.

O que acontece com a informação?

Todas as informações pessoais vão ser tratadas confidencialmente. O projeto vai ser finalizado dia 1 de Junho 2017. A nossa conversa vai ser gravada, mas o material só vai ser do meu uso próprio para o meu estudo. Depois de 1 ano vai ser apagado. Todos os entrevistados serão anônimos.

Participação voluntária

Participação no estudo é voluntária, e você pode, a qualquer hora retirar o seu consentimento, sem especificar o porquê.

Se você tem dúvidas sobre o projeto, pode entrar em contato com Isabella M. Facconi no email: isabella.facconi@gmail.com

Como isto é um projeto escolar, eu tenho um supervisor na Universidade de Agder, que pode ser contatado pelo email: hans.k.lysgard@uia.no

O estudo é relatado ao provedor de Justiça de Privacidade por Pesquisa na Noruega (NSD - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS).

Como estou um simples estudante, não posso dar nem um tipo de gratificação. Mas se você está interessado em ver o resultado da minha pesquisa, eu posso te mandar o resumo português no final do exame.

Agradeço muito pelo seu tempo.

Attachment 2: Interview guide

Former residents of Metrô Mangueira, Mangueira I and II

- How was your life at Metrô Mangueira?
- Could you please tell how you experienced the process of relocation from Metrô Mangueira to Mangueira II?
- How would you say that the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympics 2016 had affected the process of urban development in Mangueira?
- In what way had your life changed after you moved to Mangueira II?
 - Access to school, work, family/friends, public services, etc?
- To what degree do you feel that you are included in the society in Mangueira?
- In general, would you say that the situation in Mangueira have become better or worse due to these changes? In what way?
- What are the positive/negative effects of FIFA and OL?
- Did you have the opportunity to participate in the decision making process for the planning of urban development in Mangueira? How/why not?
- How do you see the future for Mangueira?

Associations

- Could you please give me a short introduction to your association/project and what you do?
- What is your role in the society? Why is the association/project important for the community?
- In what way had FIFA/OL affected urban development in Mangueira?
 - Positive/negative effects
- Has the urban changes affected the daily life of the residents of Mangueira?
- To what degree would you say that the residents of Mangueira I and II are included in the society in Mangueira?
- Has there been possible for locals to participate in decision making process?
 - How/why not?
- What are the future prospects of the Mangueira and its residents?

Local Government

- Could you please explain to me the process of planning for housing projects with “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” for the residents of Metrô Mangueira?
- How did the planning and execution of the project “Mangueira I and II” go?
- In what way would you say FIFA/OL affected the process?
- How was the residents of Metrô Mangueira informed about the process?
- In what way did you meet resistance from the residents?
- What are the residents’ situation today? Why?
- To what degree would you say that the residents of Mangueira I and II are included in the society in Mangueira?

Christopher Gaffney

- Could you please tell me about your experiences from Metrô Mangueira, Maracanã and around?
- In what way would you say the World Cup 2014 and Summer Olympics 2016 affected the evictions from Metrô Mangueira?
- How was the residents of Metrô Mangueira informed about the process before and during the evictions?
- What possibilities did the residents have of participating in the decision-making about their evictions and location of new housing?
- What did the residents want to accomplish with their resistance?
- In what way did local authorities meet resistance from the residents?
- What are the residents' situation today? Why?
- To what degree would you say that the residents of Metrô Mangueira was included in the society of Mangueira?

Attachment 3: Interview guide in Portuguese / Guia de entrevista

Minha Casa Minha Vida: Mangueira I e II

- Como era a sua vida no Metrô Mangueira?
- Pode, por favor, mim contar como foi as suas experiencias do processo do remoção da Metrô Mangueira ate Mangueira I ou II?
- De qual maneira a Copa do Mundo 2014, e as Olympiadas 2016 afetou o processo urbana na Mangueira?
- De qual maneira a sua vida mudou depois de ter mudado a Mangueira I ou II?
 - Assessoria a trabalho, escola, familia/amigos, servicos publicos etc.?
- In qual grau você se sentiu incluído na sociedade da Mangueira?
- In geral, a situação na Mangueira ficou melhor ou pior depois das mudanças no bairro? Como?
- Qual são os afetos negativos e positivos dos megaeventos?
- Em qual modo você teve oportunidade de participar no planejamento urbana no Metrô Mangueira e durante o processo de remoção? Não, por que?
- Como você vê o futuro da Mangueira?

Associações

- Pode, por favor, mim dar um pequeno introdução do seu associação/projeto social, e o que você faz?
- Qual é o papel do associação/projeto social na sociedade da Mangueira?
- O por que o associação/projeto social é importante no bairro?
- De qual maneira a Copa do Mundo 2014, e as Olympiadas 2016 afetou o processo urbana na Mangueira?
- De qual maneira a vida dos moradores mudou por causa das mudanças urbanas na Mangueira?
 - Assessoria a trabalho, escola, familia/amigos, servicos publicos etc.?
- In qual grau você acha que os moradores na Mangueira I e II são incluído na sociedade da Mangueira? Por que/por que não?
- Em qual modo os moradores da Mangueira tiveram oportunidade de participar no planejamento urbana da Mangueira? Não, por que?
- Como você vê o futuro da Mangueira?

Prefeitura

- Pode, por favor, explicar o que é o projeto Minha Casa Minha Vida?
- Pode, por favor, explicar o processo de planejamento da Minha Casa Minha Vida para os habitantes no Metrô Mangueira?
- Você acha, e de qual maneira a Copa do Mundo 2014, e as Olympiadas 2016 afetou os processos urbanos na Mangueira?
- Como você acha que o planejamento e a atuação do remoção da Metrô Mangueira ate Mangueira I e II foi?

- De que modo os moradores do Metrô Mangueira foi informado sobre o remoção anterior?
- De qual jeito vocês lidaram com a resistenciã dos moradores?
- Qual é o papel da Prefeitura para manter as casas da MCMV quando os moradores não tem condições de esta reformando?
- Qual projetos sociais a Prefeitura tem pra dar seguimento aos problemas sociais nas novas sociedades da MCMV?
- In qual grau você acha que os moradores na Mangueira I e II são incuido na sociedade da Mangueira? Por que/por que não?

Attachment 4: Detailed field note

The Samba School Alley

The last rehearsal for the samba school before the carnival starts is a large party called '*ultima feijoada*¹¹'. The samba school is open for all who wants to join the party, residents of Mangueira, others from Rio de Janeiro and tourists. The samba school rehears on stage while the audience dance, drink, eat and have fun. The Samba School of Mangueira is one of the most famous of Rio de Janeiro and is located with the audience entrance outside of the favela, while the rest of the samba school is inside the favela. The criminal gangs finance most of the expenses the samba school has, and therefore controls much of what happens inside the samba school.

The day of the '*ultima feijoada*', I was inside the complex of Mangueira with one of my informants and we decided to go there. When we passed the side of the samba school, still inside the favela, we met someone I believe was the criminal leader of Mangueira. People were circling him, hugging him with bend heads, like children that had done something terribly wrong, you could see he had power. We shook hands and talked a little about my research before my informant and me left to meet some others in front of the samba school. When all had come and we were ready to go into the samba school, we passed the ticket office. I asked the others and they said there was no need to buy a ticket, and I followed them. Again, we entered the favela and met with the criminal leader, which took us to a large iron gate.

The large, heavy, screaming iron gates opened and we entered the alley of the samba school. The iron gates closed behind us. Inside the alley there was a few tables and chairs and a large pot of '*feijoada*'. There were five to seven men seated there, with heavy gold necklaces and tattoos, large arms was set up by the wall and guns on the tables. Children with plaits waiting for food from the large pot. They men seated were all very kind and interested in my research. After talking with them for some minutes, iron gates at the other side of the alley opened, we went through them and suddenly we were in the middle of the party at the samba school, and you could no longer see where we had come from. When I talk about this experience in the time after, many Brazilians say I have accessed a place many Brazilians do not access.

¹¹ Bean stew, a traditional Brazilian meal.

Attachment 5: Notification form to Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS (NSD) about personal information



MELDESKJEMA

Meldeskjema (versjon 1.6) for forsknings- og studentprosjekt som medfører meldepikt eller konsesjonspikt (jf. personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter).

1. Intro		
Samles det inn direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger?	Ja • Nei ○	En person vil være direkte identifiserbar via navn, personnummer, eller andre personentydige kjennetegn. Les mer om hva personopplysninger er.
Hvis ja, hvilke?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Navn <input type="checkbox"/> 11-sifret fødselsnummer <input type="checkbox"/> Adresse <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> E-post <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telefonnummer <input type="checkbox"/> Annet	NB! Selv om opplysningene skal anonymiseres i oppgaverapport, må det krysses av dersom det skal innhentes/registreres personidentifiserende opplysninger i forbindelse med prosjektet. Les mer om hva behandling av personopplysninger innebærer.
Annet, spesifiser hvilke		
Skal direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger kobles til datamaterialet (koblingsnøkkel)?	Ja ○ Nei •	Merk at meldepikten utløses selv om du ikke får tilgang til koblingsnøkkel, slik fremgangsmåten ofte er når man benytter en databehandler.
Samles det inn bakgrunnsopplysninger som kan identifisere enkeltpersoner (indirekte personidentifiserende opplysninger)?	Ja • Nei ○	En person vil være indirekte identifiserbar dersom det er mulig å identifisere vedkommende gjennom bakgrunnsopplysninger som for eksempel bostedskommune eller arbeidsplass/skole kombinert med opplysninger som alder, kjønn, yrke, diagnose, etc.
Hvis ja, hvilke	Fra bestemte områder, boligprosjekter, NGO'er	NB! For at stemme skal regnes som personidentifiserende, må denne bli registrert i kombinasjon med andre opplysninger, slik at personer kan gjenkjennes.
Skal det registreres personopplysninger (direkte/indirekte/via IP-/e-post adresse, etc.) ved hjelp av nettbaserte spørreskjema?	Ja ○ Nei •	Les mer om nettbaserte spørreskjema .
Bli det registrert personopplysninger på digitale bilde- eller videoopptak?	Ja ○ Nei •	Bilde/videoopptak av ansikter vil regnes som personidentifiserende.
Søkes det vurdering fra REK om hvorvidt prosjektet er omfattet av helseforskningsloven?	Ja ○ Nei •	NB! Dersom REK (Regional Komité for medisinsk og helsefaglig forskningsetikk) har vurdert prosjektet som helseforskning, er det ikke nødvendig å sende inn meldeskjema til personvernombudet (NB! Gjelder ikke prosjekter som skal benytte data fra pseudonyme helseregistre). Les mer. Dersom tilbakemelding fra REK ikke foreligger, anbefaler vi at du avventer videre utfylling til svar fra REK foreligger.
2. Prosjektittel		
Prosjektittel	Masteroppgave: In what way has the mega-sports events (FIFA World Cup 2014 and IOC Olympics 2016) been important for urban development in the favela of Mangueira, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil?	Oppgi prosjektets tittel. NB! Dette kan ikke være «Masteroppgave» eller liknende, navnet må beskrive prosjektets innhold.
3. Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon		
Institusjon	Universitetet i Agder	Velg den institusjonen du er tilknyttet. Alle nivå må oppgis. Ved studentprosjekt er det studentens tilknytning som er avgjørende. Dersom institusjonen ikke finnes på listen, har den ikke avtale med NSD som personvernombud. Vennligst ta kontakt med institusjonen.
Avdeling/Fakultet	Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap	
Institutt	Institutt for global utvikling og samfunnsplanlegging	Les mer om behandlingsansvarlig institusjon .
4. Daglig ansvarlig (forsker, veileder, stipendiat)		

Attachment 6: Feedback from NSD about the treatment of personal information (3 pages in Norwegian).



Hans Kjetil Lysgård
Institutt for global utvikling og samfunnsplanlegging Universitetet i Agder
Postboks 422
4604 KRISTIANSAND S

Vår dato: 07.03.2017 Vår ref: 52431 / 3 / AGH Deres dato: Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 23.01.2017. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

52431	<i>In what way has the mega-sports events (FIFA World Cup 2014 and IOC Olympics 2016) been important for urban development in the favela of Mangueira, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil?</i>
Behandlingsansvarlig	Universitetet i Agder, ved Institusjonens øverste leder
Daglig ansvarlig	Hans Kjetil Lysgård
Student	Isabella Morken Faconl

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilrår at prosjektet gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, <http://www.nsd.ulb.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html>. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, <http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt>.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 01.06.2017, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Kjersti Haugstvedt

Agnete Hessevik

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.

Kontaktperson: Agnete Hessevåg tlf: 55 58 27 97

Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Kopt: Isabella Morken Facconi Isabella.facconi@gmail.com

Personvernombudet for forskning



Prosjektvurdering - Kommentar

Prosjektnr: 52431

Vi legger til grunn at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med retningslinjer/lover i Brasil.

Utvalget består av beboere i nabolaget Mangueira, ansatte i lokale organisasjoner og eventuelt politikere.

Personvernombudet tar høyde for at det kan registreres sensitive opplysninger om politisk oppfatning.

I følge meldeskjemaet skal du innhente data gjennom personlig intervju, (deltakende) observasjon og fra blogg/sosiale medier/internett. Vi forutsetter at du innhenter et informert samtykke på forhånd fra alle du innhenter personidentifiserende opplysninger om ved bruk av disse metodene.

Utvalget informeres skriftlig og muntlig om prosjektet og samtykker til deltakelse. Informasjonsskrivet vedlagt meldeskjemaet er på portugisisk og personvernombudet har derfor ikke vurdert dette. Med utgangspunkt i opplysningene du har gitt i meldeskjemaet, må deltakerne få følgende informasjon for at samtykket skal være gyldig:

- hvilken institusjon som er ansvarlig for prosjektet (UIA)
- prosjektets formål / problemstilling
- hva deltakelse i prosjektet innebærer (metoder og hvilke opplysninger som samles inn)
- at det er frivillig å delta og at man kan trekke seg når som helst uten begrunnelse
- at opplysningene behandles konfidensielt og hvem som vil ha tilgang
- dato/tidspunkt for planlagt anonymisering av datamaterialet (01.06.2017)
- hvorvidt enkeltpersoner vil kunne gjenkjennes i den ferdige oppgaven
- kontaktopplysninger student og veileder

Vi forutsetter at du går gjennom informasjonsskrivet og sørger for at alle ovennevnte punkter er med, slik at samtykket du får fra den enkelte er gyldig.

Personvernombudet legger til grunn at du etterfølger Universitetet i Agder sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet.

Forventet prosjektslutt er 01.06.2017. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres ved å:

- slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsmekkel)
- slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som f.eks. bosted/arbeidsted, alder og kjønn)
- slette eventuelle lydopptak